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Second round

 After Bonos and Obligaciones and Letras del Tesoro bids have been entered and resolved on in auction, a second round will be held exclusively for Public Debt Market makers.

The second round will take place between the end of the auction and 12:00 P.M of the previous day of the effective date (D+3). 

A maximum of 24% of the nominal amount of each bond or Letra allocated at auction will be issued in this second phase.
All bids for Bonos y Obligaciones will be met at the rounded-up weighted average price arising from the auction phase and in the Letras case, all bids will be met at the rounded-up weighted average interest rate arising from the auction phase. However, when calling auctions, the General Secretariat of the Treasury and Financial Policy may specify some other allocation method for second round sales. Making use of this prerogative, at present and due to market conditions, bids for the second round will be allotted at the rounded weighted marginal price resulting from the auction phase.
 
The share of the second round that can be obtained by each Market maker that qualifies will be equal to that market maker’s combined allotment in both the current auction and the previous auction of the similar bond or Letra. If it is the first auction a bond, the share will be the combined allotment in the current auction and the latest auction of the closest benchmark.
 
The maximum percentage of the second round for each Market maker is divided into several tranches:
  • A 24% of the nominal allotted in the auction, which the Treasury may distribute among the most active Market makers, according to the last evaluation periods previous to the auction and those Market makers that have also complied with the minimum quoting obligations during the last evaluation period previous to the auction.
     
  • A 20% of the nominal allotted in the auction, which the Treasury may distribute among those Market makers that have complied with the minimum quoting obligations during the last evaluation period previous to the auction and that are not among the most active Market makers, according to the last evaluation periods previous to the auction.
     
  • A 4% of the nominal allotted in the auction, among the most active Market makers, according to the last evaluation periods previous to the auction and that have not complied with the minimum quoting obligations during the last evaluation period previous to the auction.
     
  • A 0%, to those Market makers which have not been among the most active market makers, according to the last evaluation periods previous to the auction and that have not complied with the minimum quoting obligations during the last evaluation period previous to the auction.