SECTORAL ANALYSIS OF

LEGAL PERSONS AND LEGAL ARRANGEMENTS

2026



VICEPRESIDENCIA
PRIMERA DEL GOBIERNO
MINISTERIO
DE ECONOMÍA,
COMERCIO Y EMPRESA

COMISIÓN DE PREVENCIÓN DEL
BLANQUEO DE CAPITALES E
INFRACCIONES MONETARIAS

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1. Executive Summary

Legal persons and legal arrangements are an essential element in the functioning of the economic system, serving as instruments for the organisation of business activity, investment and the channelling of legal and financial relationships.

In Spain, the legal persons sector comprises commercial and non-commercial entities, which may or may not be profit-making. As regards legal structures, so-called *trusts or express trusts*, as defined in Article 2 of the Hague Convention, are neither permitted nor recognised by the Spanish legal system as entities that can be validly established, as Spain is not a signatory to that Convention. The institution in Spain that most closely approximates the above would be the testamentary trust, used in the context of succession to entrust a person with the management or transfer of certain assets in accordance with the testator's wishes. However, as highlighted in the analysis carried out, the characteristics of the testamentary trust mean that it is in no way comparable to the concept of *an express trust*.

However, as has been widely recognised internationally, these structures can be misused to commit money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (TF) offences, particularly when they have characteristics that hinder transparency, traceability or the identification of the beneficial owner. In this regard, Recommendations 24 and 25 of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) emphasise the need for countries to identify, understand and mitigate the risks associated with individuals and legal structures, in accordance with a risk-based approach.

The aim of this analysis is to identify and assess the ML/TF threats, vulnerabilities and risk levels associated with the various types of individuals and legal arrangements in Spain. To this end, quantitative and qualitative information has been used, drawn from official registers, tip-off reports, financial intelligence reports, police and judicial investigations, as well as the operational experience of regulated entities and competent authorities.

From the perspective of **threats**, the analysis reveals that individuals and legal persons can be used for illicit purposes through various patterns of behaviour, notably: (i) instrumental or purpose-driven use, involving the use of intermediary entities to hold or own assets; (ii) gradual use, consisting of the progressive introduction of illicit funds into the formal economy; and (iii) one-off or isolated use, based on the simulation of transactions with the aim of creating the appearance of economic legitimacy. These patterns are most frequently identified in structures characterised by their flexibility, ease of incorporation and ability to operate in environments with limited supervision.

As regards empirical evidence, analysis of the available information indicates a significant presence of legal persons in suspicious transactions, accounting for around 30 per cent of suspicious activity reports and financial intelligence reports. Within this group, limited liability companies (LLC) account for the majority of cases, reflecting their high prevalence in the economic system and their particular exposure to the risk of misuse. Furthermore, transactions involving foreign legal persons with a structure similar to that of Spanish LLC have been observed, highlighting the trans n dimension of the phenomenon and the need to strengthen international cooperation mechanisms.

The **vulnerabilities** identified in the analysis have focused on those inherent to the sector itself (arising from the sector's regulatory framework, sector of activity or identification of the ultimate beneficial owner), Spain's geostrategic position within the international framework, as well as

vulnerabilities in certain areas of Spain, particularly concentrated in the Campo de Gibraltar region.

Thus, the analysis identifies as a key factor the existence of inactive or non-compliant entities which, despite lacking any effective economic activity or failing to fulfil their formal obligations, retain their legal personality. This circumstance creates significant shortcomings in terms of transparency, hindering access to up-to-date information on beneficial ownership and activity, and constituting a significant vector for the instrumental use of such entities. This structural vulnerability is compounded by operational vulnerabilities, such as the ease with which certain entities can be incorporated, the absence of a requirement to submit financial statements in some cases, the broad scope of the stated corporate purpose, and the use of intermediaries and complex structures that make it difficult to identify effective control.

Furthermore, the risk is influenced by sectoral and geographical factors. Certain sectors, such as property, hospitality and international trade, are more exposed due to the specific characteristics of their operations, whilst Spain's geostrategic position, as a hub connecting different regions, increases its attractiveness for channelling financial flows from diverse sources. Furthermore, specific geographical areas with a higher concentration of risk have been identified, associated with a high level of international economic activity and the presence of certain types of criminal activity.

On the basis of the above, an assessment has been made of **the inherent risk** by type of individual or legal entity. In this regard, particular attention is drawn to limited liability companies at national level (irregular LLCs, inactive LLCs, LLCs with revoked tax identification numbers, LLCs with partners who are natural persons resident or domiciled in high-risk territories, LLCs with partners who are legal persons domiciled in high-risk territories linked to a lack of transparency, asset-holding LLCs, and LLCs with complex shareholding structures), whose risk levels range from high to substantial. Similarly, foreign legal entities, particularly those from non-cooperative jurisdictions with lower levels of transparency, as well as *trusts* and similar structures, present high levels of risk, due to the complexity and lack of transparency they may introduce, and to the files analysed and reported by the notary and registry sector to the Executive Service for the Prevention of Money Laundering, Servicio Ejecutivo de la Comisión de Prevención del Blanqueo de Capitales e Infracciones Monetarias (Sepblac) as part of their obligations as regulated entities.

In contrast, amongst domestic legal persons, cooperatives, economic interest groups and worker-owned companies present lower levels of risk, given their specific characteristics and their less frequent use in illicit schemes.

The use of legal arrangements in Spain is not common; the establishment of trusts is not permitted, and the only legal structure available is the succession trust, which is used only in very limited circumstances and is associated with a lower risk than the companies identified above.

In any case, the inherent risk must be contextualised in light of the country's specific risk profile and context and taking into account that the main threats materialise through the instrumental use of entities to conceal assets, the gradual integration of illicit funds, or the carrying out of sham transactions, linked to organised crime, drug trafficking and tax offences. These threats are facilitated by structural vulnerabilities, notably the existence of inactive or non-compliant entities, which operate with little transparency and limited traceability. Added to this are operational factors (such as the criteria for incorporation, opacity regarding beneficial ownership

or the absence of financial oversight) and contextual elements, such as the exposure of certain economic sectors and Spain's geostrategic position, which act as risk amplifiers.

The mitigation measures in place under Spanish law include both those adopted by the public sector (such as registration systems, mechanisms for identifying beneficial ownership, supervision by competent authorities and the sanctions regime) and those implemented by regulated entities, which include due diligence procedures, monitoring of transactions and continuous risk assessment.

As a result of the application of these measures, the **residual risk** is generally at levels lower than the inherent risk, although significant risk profiles remain in certain types of structures, specifically those identified in the preceding paragraphs.

In conclusion, the analysis shows that the system is exposed to a heterogeneous level of ML/TF risk, with a clear concentration in certain types of legal structures, particularly limited liability companies with the characteristics outlined above and non-EU individuals and legal entities. In any case, once the inherent risk level has been adjusted considering existing mitigation measures and the contextual framework, the residual risk remains high for foreign legal entities, is reduced to substantial for limited companies incorporated in Spain, and to medium in the case of foreign legal structures.

Based on this sectoral risk analysis, the mitigating measures designed to address these identified risks for legal persons and structures are integrated in a coordinated manner into the National Anti-Money Laundering Strategy, approved on 12 June 2026.

2. Introduction

2.1 Overview

Legal persons and legal arrangements legal persons (hereinafter 'LPLA) are a fundamental instrument for business activity in the global economy, for the functioning of the modern economy, the protection of individuals' rights and the promotion of social welfare.

Legal persons, according to Article 35 of the Civil Code, are corporations, associations and public-interest foundations recognised by law, as well as private-interest associations – whether civil, commercial or industrial – to which the law grants a legal personality of their own, independent of that of each of their members.

In any case, these are entities with rights and obligations, which facilitate economic activity, enable the management of human and financial resources, and promote social contribution, hence their importance worldwide.

Legal arrangements, for their part, are organisational forms through which economic activity can be carried out or assets managed. In Spain, they are of very limited significance in terms of usage and complexity; indeed, the testamentary trust, regulated by Articles 781 to 789 of the Civil Code, is not comparable to the concept of a legal structure referred to in the FATF methodology. However, at the international level, some of these structures do have significant relevance and are considered to pose a higher risk due to their potential to conceal beneficial ownership or channel cross-border transactions, which may have an impact in Spain, albeit a limited one.

The aim of this analysis is to examine the misuse of legal persons and legal arrangements (LPLA) from the perspective of money laundering and terrorist financing (hereinafter ML/TF). The main risks associated with this misuse are:

- Facilitation of illegal activities and the channelling into the financial system of illicit funds generated by criminal activities, such as drug trafficking or corruption.
- The complexity and opacity of intricate structures, which make it difficult to identify the true owners and beneficial owners.
- Misuse of non-profit organisations (NPOs)[1] to channel funds towards terrorist activities.
- Legal and reputational consequences arising from, amongst other things, the imposition of sanctions that may lead to the loss of clients and business partners.
- Impact on the economy, as confidence in the country is eroded and competition in the market is distorted.
- Difficulties in regulation and supervision to prevent the misuse of SMEs.

It is therefore essential that both the authorities and the LPLA themselves implement effective measures to prevent and combat these malpractices.

For this reason, the FATF, an intergovernmental body that sets global standards on the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, devotes its Recommendations 24 and 25 (R. 24 and

[1] See https://www.tesoro.es/prevencion-del-blanqueo-y-movimiento-de-efectivo/legislaci%C3%B3n/guias-y-orientaciones/evaluacion-de-riesgos/analisis-sectoriales

R. 25) and Immediate Outcome 5 (IO 5) to preventing the misuse of these LPLA, in particular by promoting transparency regarding their beneficial owners.

In this regard, the amendment and expansion of Recommendations 24 and 25 in March 2022 and February 2023 are particularly noteworthy, having led to a strengthening of standards in this area, in particular, the establishment of the so-called multi-tiered approach[2] to ensure that information on the beneficial ownership of LPLAs established in the country, as well as those posing ML/TF risks and having sufficient links to the country, is precise, accurate and up to date. Furthermore, international standards also provide for the necessary ML/TF risk analysis for these same LPLAs, with a view to adopting appropriate mitigating measures.

At European level, these changes have been reflected in the European Union's new anti-money laundering and counter- ism[3] package, which emphasises the importance of transparency regarding beneficial ownership. Of particular note is the importance attached to risk awareness, given that Article 8 of the so-called Sixth Directive refers to the need to include in the National Risk Assessment an evaluation of *"the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing associated with each type of legal person established within its territory and with each type of legal arrangement governed by national law, administered within its territory or whose trustees or persons holding equivalent positions in similar legal arrangements reside within its territory, and to gain an understanding of the exposure to risks arising from foreign legal persons and legal arrangements".* The aim of this analysis is, therefore, to gain a detailed understanding of the risks posed by these foreign legal persons and arrangements.

2.2 Objectives

The overall objective of this document is to identify and understand the ML/TF threats, vulnerabilities and risks in foreign legal persons in Spain. This overall objective is further articulated in the following **specific objectives**:

- To identify the types of foreign legal persons incorporated in Spain.
- To identify, understand and assess the inherent risks within the sector, taking into account foreign legal persons incorporated in Spain and abroad but operating in Spain.
- To identify, understand and assess the residual risks once the adopted mitigation measures have been implemented.
- To determine courses of action for mitigating the identified risks.
- To produce a public document, accessible to organisations within the LPLA sector, which they can use as a basis for understanding the risks to which they are exposed and for implementing the appropriate mitigation measures.

[2] A multi-level approach is understood to mean the use of a combination of different mechanisms for gathering information on beneficial ownership, including the holding of such information by the EoEs themselves, by regulated entities, and the existence of public registers, whilst establishing mechanisms for verifying that information.

3. Methodology

The methodology used to analyse the risk posed by legal persons and legal arrangements is based on the identification of threats[3] and vulnerabilities[4] in accordance with the FATF approach, which has made it possible to determine an inherent risk for each type of entity. This inherent risk is adjusted in line with the mitigating measures adopted at national level for each legal person or arrangement, taking into account existing regulations and controls. These mitigating measures enable the residual risk of their use for ML/TF-related purposes to be determined.

Furthermore, to strengthen the assessment, the World Bank's *'Legal Persons and Arrangements ML Risk Assessment* Tool' has been used, which provides a structured framework for assessing the specific threats and vulnerabilities that may affect these legal persons and arrangements. With regard to vulnerabilities, those of a general nature—that is, those affecting the entire sector in a similar way—have been identified, as well as those specific to the characteristics of each individual or legal entity.

Various national and international sources of information were considered for the analysis, and consultations were held with the competent public authorities in each area and with representatives of the private sector. Annexes I and II contain the supporting documents used in preparing this analysis, as well as details of the participating institutions.

In accordance with the rating system established in Article 12(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 establishing the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Authority, the levels of inherent and residual risk shall be rated as follows:

Low	Medium	Substantial	High

While the inherent and residual risk levels have been assessed taking into account the rating system established in Article 12(3) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1620 of the European Parliament and of the Council, the analysis carried out for the purposes of this methodology has required the introduction of intermediate risk levels. These intermediate categories are intended to provide a more granular and proportionate assessment of risks, allowing for a more accurate differentiation between situations that, although falling within the same regulatory risk category, exhibit materially different risk characteristics:

Low/Medium	Medium/Substantial	Substantial/High

[3] 'Threats' means those persons, groups of persons or their activities which pose a potential danger due to their capacity to cause harm to the State, society, the economy or other fundamental aspects of a country's life.

[4] "Vulnerabilities" are those situations and circumstances that may be exploited or used by organisations or individuals seeking to carry out money laundering or terrorist financing activities.

4. Status of legal persons and legal arrangements in Spain

For the purposes of the FATF, the definitions are as follows:

Legal Person: *'Any entity, other than a natural person, that may establish a permanent customer relationship with a financial institution or otherwise hold assets'.* This includes companies, partnerships, foundations, associations or similar entities with legal personality under the applicable national legislation.

Legal Arrangement: This refers to a relationship established by a legal instrument between two or more parties which does not result in the creation of a legal person.

Within the concept of a legal arrangement, the FATF defines the concept of an express trust, of the 'trust' type, in that it is understood that legal arrangements analogous to express *trusts* are those that warrant specific scrutiny.

Specifically, it is stated that an *'express trust' refers to a trust clearly created by the settlor, usually in the form of a document, e.g. a trust deed. These contrast with trusts that come into being by operation of law and are not the result of a settlor's clear intention or decision to create a trust or a similar legal structure (e.g. a constructive trust)".*

In Spain, the **legal persons** sector comprises various **legal forms** that may be used for commercial, professional, non-profit or public-sector activities. In this analysis, we will divide them into commercial legal persons and those established on a non-profit basis.

a) Types of commercial legal entities
- Limited Liability Company.
- Public Limited Company.
- Commercial General Partnership.
- General Partnership
- Limited Partnership.
- Joint-stock limited partnership.
- Co-operative.
- Economic Interest Grouping.
- Mutual Guarantee Society.
- Workers' Co-operative.
- Corporate Joint Ventures (Corporate Joint Ventures and Equity Joint Ventures).

b) Types of non-profit legal entities
- Foundation.
- Association.
- Political party.
- Trade union and professional association.
- Religious organisation.
- Non-governmental development organisation.

On the other hand, in Spain, the concept of *the trust* as such does not exist in the Spanish legal system[5] , as it is a concept specific to Anglo-Saxon law (*common law*). However, there is the 'fiducia', regulated in Articles 781 to 808 of the Civil Code, a legal instrument which, conceptually, might bear some resemblance to the Anglo-Saxon trust, but which has notable differences in terms of its characteristics, setting it apart from the latter and limiting its potential use for AML/CFT purposes, as we shall see in this section.

4.1 Commercial legal entities

The data provided by the Association of Registrars on commercial entities registered in the Commercial Register (as at 31 December 2024) reveals the following information:

Table 1. Commercial entities registered in the Commercial Register as at 31 December 2024

	Total Registered	Dissolved/ Wound up	Active Entities	Not required to file 2024	Annual Accounts for 2024 Submitted
Limited Liability Limited	3,795,585	675,094	3,120,491	97,975	1,037,436
Public Limited Company	516,294	152,524	363,770	278	33,654
Commercial partnership	3,188	661	2,527	959	118
General Partnership	9,859	3,066	6,793	8,271	486
Limited Partnership	2,450	628	1,822	2,312	66
Limited Partnership with Share Capital	208	50	158	5	50
Economic Interest Grouping	9,448	3,397	6,051	1,120	2,454
Workers' cooperatives	48,103	10,115	37,988	168	8,278
Corporate joint venture	3,473	370	3,103	232	11

Source: Commercial Register

As regards Mutual Guarantee Societies (MGSs), the number of such societies registered with the Banco de España stood at 18 as at 31 December 2025.

Analysis of the data shows that, whilst there are almost 4 million legal persons with a valid registration, fewer than a third submit accounts, leading to a high number of inactive legal persons – an issue which will be analysed in the section on vulnerabilities. Furthermore, an analysis of the various types of companies registered in Spain reveals a clear concentration in Limited Liability Companies (LLC.), which by a wide margin represent the predominant form, with over 3.1 million active entities, although only a third of these submit annual accounts. Public limited companies (PLC), whilst being the second most common form, account for a significantly smaller volume, both in terms of total number and in terms of registration and notarial activity.

[5] In this regard, it should be noted that Spain has not ratified the 1985 Hague Convention.

Other types of companies, such as general partnerships, limited partnerships, economic interest groupings, commercial civil partnerships or *joint ventures* of a corporate nature, have a quantitatively marginal presence, although they maintain varying levels of financial statement filing.

With regard to the relevant legislation, by type of commercial company, this is set out in Annex III.

4.2 Non-commercial legal persons

According to the available data, the estimated number of non-commercial legal persons is as follows:

Table 2. Estimate of the number of non-commercial legal persons

	Estimated number	Reference register
Foundations	15,821	Register of foundations under central government jurisdiction and other regional registers
Associations	66,011	National Register of Associations
Political parties	4,172	Register of Political Parties
Trade unions	8,786[6]	Ministry of Labour Register of Trade Union Organisations
Professional associations	22,291	Sectoral or regional registers
Religious organisations	21,818 [7]	Register of religious organisations

Source: compiled by the authors based on information from the various reference registers.

With regard to the relevant legislation, by type of non-commercial legal entity, this is set out in Annex IV.

4.3 Entities without legal personality

Under Spanish law, certain legal structures without legal personality are recognised which, however, are not comparable to the *'express* trust' as defined by the FATF.

4.2.1 Trusts and unclaimed estates

Express trusts are defined by the FATF as *"a legal arrangement voluntarily and expressly created by a person (the settlor) to transfer legal title to certain assets to another person (the trustee), who administers them for the benefit of third parties (beneficiaries) or for a specific purpose*". In the FATF Guidance on Beneficial Ownership and Transparency of Other Legal Arrangements, the identification of express trusts refers to the definition set out in Article 2 of the Hague Convention

[6] This includes all trade union organisations with valid legal personality registered with all labour authorities.

[7] Data as at 26 June 2026

of 1 July 1985 on the Law Applicable to Trusts and their Recognition[8] . Therefore, according to this definition, the following characteristics are evident in this legal arrangement:

- Express and voluntary creation by a settlor, not by statute or judicial interpretation. A written document may be involved.
- Lack of legal personality in its own right. It is a legal relationship between parties and assets.
- Transfer of control from the settlor to the trustee, who holds legal title but not the economic benefit.
- Fiduciary administration. The *trustee* has a fiduciary duty to administer the assets in accordance with the terms of the *trust* and in the interests of the beneficiaries or the established purpose.
- Specified beneficiaries or purposes.
- Separation of assets. The assets of *the trust* are separate from the personal assets of *the trustee* and the *settlor*.

As regards the definition of other legal arrangements arrangements (*'similar arrangements*') provided by the FATF, although the aforementioned FATF Guidance does not define the concept, it does state that, whilst express trusts are typical *common law* structures, the other legal arrangements are functionally equivalent fiduciary arrangements used in *non-trust* jurisdictions. Both share the separation of control and benefit, the absence of legal personality and the need to identify beneficial owners in accordance with the Recommendation.

In Spain, the only instrument that might bear some resemblance would be the 'fiducia', whereby a natural or legal person (the settlor) transfers formal ownership of one or more specific assets to a third party so that (until) the latter carries out the provisions of the so-called fiduciary agreement. The trustee must return the asset or assets in question once the obligations set out in the agreement have been fulfilled.

There are various types of fiducia, although in practice, the only arrangement that might bear some resemblance to legal arrangements similar to *a trust* is inheritance as a fiducia. Under this arrangement, the testator may delegate to a trustee the power to administer and distribute the estate's assets following their death, establishing a relationship of trust that partially mirrors the dynamic between settlor and trustee characteristic of Anglo-Saxon *trusts*.

A succession trust is more likely to be established in the case of *'vacant estates',* which refers to the set of assets, rights and possible debts that form part of a temporary period during which

[8] For the purposes of this Convention, the term *'trust'* refers to legal relationships created – by an *inter vivos* or *mortis causa* act – by a person, the settlor, by placing assets under the control of a *trustee* in the interests of a beneficiary or for a specific purpose.
A trust has the following characteristics: (a) the trust assets constitute a separate fund and do not form part of *the trustee's* estate; (b) title to the trust assets is held in the name of the *trustee* or another person on *the trustee's* behalf; (c) the *trustee* has the power and duty, for which he or she is accountable, to administer, manage or dispose of the assets in accordance with the terms of *the trust* and any specific obligations imposed on him or her by law.
The fact that the settlor retains certain prerogatives or that the *trustee* holds certain rights as a beneficiary is not necessarily incompatible with the existence of a *trust*.

the assets of an estate have no clear owner; in other words, ownership of the deceased's assets is vacant.

However, the succession trust is very rarely used in Spain, due to its limited practical application and its strictly succession-related scope. It is very important to emphasise that the characteristics and effects of fideicommissary substitutions are completely different from those of Anglo-Saxon *trusts*, and this allows them to be clearly distinguished, in particular:

- The existence of a dual or multiple succession to the enjoyment of the same assets. There are two heirs: the first heir, who is the trustee, and a second heir, the beneficiary.

- The existence of a duty to preserve and return the assets, imposed on the trustee for the benefit of the beneficiary; however, the testator may authorise the trustee to dispose of the assets in such a way that, if the trustee disposes of them under the conditions specified or required by the testator, there may be no assets left to transfer to the beneficiary.

- The establishment of a sequential order for the acquisition of the inheritance. Thus, the testator provides that the trustee inherits first and, once a period has elapsed or a condition has been fulfilled, the assets pass to the beneficiary.

Furthermore, the following effects are noteworthy:

- Before the condition or time limit under which the assets pass to the beneficiary is met, the trustee is a true heir and, as such, becomes the owner of the assets and rights subject to the substitution; and as such an owner, acquires the use and enjoyment of the encumbered assets. 'Use' implies the possibility of utilising the property, whilst 'enjoyment' implies the right to receive the fruits it produces, both natural fruits—such as crops from the land—and civil fruits, which are interest or income. Consequently, for all purposes, including tax purposes, the owner of the assets is the trustee, who—unless authorised by the testator to dispose of the assets—is obliged to preserve them and deliver them to the beneficiary once the specified period has elapsed or the stipulated condition has been fulfilled.

- Once the condition or time limit set by the testator or settlor has been met, the trustee must hand over the assets to the beneficiary, making no deductions other than those necessary to pay inheritance debts and extraordinary expenses for the preservation of the assets; from that moment onwards, the beneficiary becomes the owner of the assets for all purposes.

For all the above reasons, a succession trust cannot be regarded as equivalent to a trust, and even less so in terms of transparency. In any case, it is very rarely used in Spain. For example, of the 72 million properties registered in the Land Registry, no more than 50,000 properties – mostly rural – are subject to this type of encumbrance, primarily in what is known as *'depopulated Spain*'. Furthermore, according to data extracted from the Register of Corporate and Fiduciary Services, of the total number of entities registered therein, only six declared that they carried out activities relating to fiduciary functions within a trust; however, when asked for further information on these operations, they stated that this was due to a misinterpretation of their services, demonstrating the entirely marginal nature of this activity in Spain.

4.1.3 Other entities without legal personality

Notwithstanding the points made in the previous section, there are various structures in Spain without legal personality that would not fall within the FATF's definition of *legal arrangements* or *express trusts*, as they do not incorporate any of the elements characteristic of such arrangements. These entities without legal personality are:

- **Contractual Joint Venture**[9] . These are collaborative agreements without legal personality, in which the parties manage and benefit directly from the joint activity. In such cases, there is no independent trustee, no separation between control and benefit, nor a tripartite fiduciary structure.
- **General Partnership**. These are based on contracts between partners who contribute assets or labour to a joint activity. Although they may act with a certain degree of legal capacity, there is no fiduciary transfer nor separation between control and benefit: the partners are both owners and beneficiaries.
- **Temporary Joint Venture (TJV)**. These are temporary collaborative structures without legal personality, with a single purpose: the joint execution of a specific project, service or supply by several companies, for a limited period, sharing risks, means, resources and benefits. They do not involve trustees or beneficiaries other than the participating members, who exercise control and benefit directly.
- **The owners' association**. Owners' associations lack legal personality and act to manage common elements. The owners are simultaneously administrators and beneficiaries, with no independent trustee or the separation of assets typical of a trust. Even if an external manager is engaged to act on their behalf, there is no independent fiduciary control.
- **Community of Property**. These are agreements between individuals to manage joint assets. They lack legal personality and there is no separation between control and benefit: the members of the community are co-owners and beneficiaries. Nor is there an independent trustee, since, even if a manager acts on their behalf, there is no independent fiduciary control.

4.4 Foreign individuals and legal arrangements with a presence in Spain

Pursuant to FATF Recommendations 24 and 25, it is necessary to identify foreign persons and legal arrangements that have a significant link with the country. Given that in Spain any foreign legal entity may operate without restriction, the following legal persons are considered to have a significant link:

Branches of foreign companies in Spain. Currently[10] , 3,674 non-resident companies with a branch in Spain are registered in the commercial register, of which 2,734 are active. These companies hold ownership of financial products and movable and immovable property, such as[11] [12].

[9] It should be noted that there are corporate-style joint ventures, as mentioned in the preceding section.
[10] Data as at 1 June 2026.
[11] Data as at 1 June 2026.
[12] Source Register of Movable Property: Ships and Aircraft Section: This is where ship mortgages, sales, leases and any other contracts, attachment orders and other encumbrances relating to ships and aircraft are registered.

- Bank accounts.
- Aircraft ownership[13]
- Ownership of ships[14]
- Ownership of immovable property.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Registry Centre, Centro Registral Antiblanqueo (hereinafter, CRAB) data, the details of these properties held by foreign branches registered in Spain are as follows:

Table 3. Properties registered in the Land Registry by foreign branches registered in Spain.

	Total in the Register	**Branches of foreign companies in Spain**
Aircraft ownership	32,676	143
Ship ownership	87,950	32
Ownership of immovable property	N/A	2,552

Source: CRAB

Legal persons not resident in Spain. They are not registered in the commercial register. They are required to have a Tax Identification Number (TIN) to carry out any transaction with tax implications. However, there are cases where it is not necessary to apply for a TIN, for example, companies registered and identified for VAT purposes in another EU Member State and covered by schemes such as the one-stop shop or distance selling. Furthermore, according to Article 28.7 of the General Regulations on Tax Administration and Inspection Procedures ( ) (RGAT), approved by Royal Decree 1065/2007, non-residents without a permanent establishment are not obliged to identify themselves with a Spanish TIN in their dealings with credit institutions.

According to data from the Land Registry, as at the date of issue of this document, there are 42,405 valid title rights registered in their names.

According to the register of movable property, as at the date of issue of this document, there are 7,115 registrations in the name of non-resident companies relating to aircraft and 1,055 registrations relating to ships.

Furthermore, an enquiry was made to SEPBLAC regarding the principal countries of residence of legal entities holding ownership interests in certain types of financial products. The results showed that the main jurisdictions identified were Portugal, the United Kingdom, France, Mexico and Italy, followed by the United States, Germany and the Netherlands.

[13] Aircraft are registered in the Madrid Register of Movable Property.

[14] Provincial registers of movable property are located in each provincial capital, as well as in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla. There are five further registers, which exist solely for the Ships section and are integrated within the Land Registries of Motril 2, Ribadeo, Vigo 4, Cartagena 1 and Gijón 2.

In addition to the data referred to in the previous paragraph, information has been extracted from the Notarial Beneficial Ownership Database, which lists a total of 249,490 foreign legal entities. From the data provided, it can be seen that the most common countries of origin are as follows:

Table 4. Main nationalities of legal persons listed in the Notarial Beneficial Ownership Database

	Countries	Percentage		Countries	Percentage
1	United Kingdom, Great Britain, Northern Ireland	10.7%	17	Denmark	1.3%
2	France	10.1%	18	Chile	1.2%
3	Luxembourg	7.9%	19	Colombia	1.1%
4	Netherlands	7.2%	20	Romania	1.0%
5	Germany	6.5%	21	Poland	1.0%
6	United States of America	5.8%	22	Malta	0.8%
7	Portugal	4.4%	23	Uruguay	0.8%
8	Italy	4.4%	24	Cyprus	0.8%
9	Belgium	3.5%	25	Finland	0.7%
10	Switzerland	2.8%	26	China	0.7%
11	Mexico	2.4%	27	Austria	0.7%
12	Sweden	2.3%	28	Argentina	0.7%
13	Ireland	2.2%	29	Brazil	0.7%
14	Norway	1.9%	30	Morocco	0.6%
15	Panama	1.9%	31	Peru	0.6%
16	Andorra	1.6%	32	Canada	0.5%

Source: OCP. Órgano Centralizado de Prevención (Centralised Prevention Agency).

Furthermore, according to the Register of Beneficial Ownership at the Commercial Register, 17,220 companies[15] have declared that they have at least one non-resident intermediate company in Spain within their chain of control. Despite these figures, it should be borne in mind that these entities represent 0.5% of Spanish companies registered in the Register of Beneficial Ownership of the Commercial Register, taking into account those declared as currently registered in Table 1 and the active branches of foreign companies identified in section 4.4.

In Table 6, for example, it is shown that more than half (59.72%) of the jurisdictions in which intermediary companies are incorporated are EU Member States, whose entities may operate under the OSS (One-Stop Shop) regime, with the associated implications for tax simplification and tax traceability.

[15] Data as at 1 June 2026.

Table 5. Main countries of domicile of non-resident intermediate companies appearing in the chain of control in the Register of Beneficial Ownership of the Commercial Register

Country registered office	Percentage	Country registered office	Percentage	Country registered office	Percentage
GERMANY	10.35%	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	0.60%	ISLE OF MAN	0.12%
FRANCE	8.49%	ISRAEL	0.53%	AUSTRALIA	0.11%
LUXEMBOURG	8.39%	SAUDI ARABIA	0.49%	PERU	0.11%
UNITED KINGDOM	8.32%	POLAND	0.43%	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	0.10%
NETHERLANDS	8.07%	COLOMBIA	0.41%	BARBADOS	0.10%
SWITZERLAND	5.60%	CZECH REPUBLIC	0.39%	AFGHANISTAN	0.10%
ITALY	5.15%	FINLAND	0.39%	SLOVENIA	0.10%
USA	5.13%	LIECHTENSTEIN	0.37%	BELIZE	0.09%
SWEDEN	4.01%	ESTONIA	0.37%	RUSSIA	0.08%
PORTUGAL	3.52%	CANADA	0.35%	TUNISIA	0.08%
ANDORRA	3.08%	HUNGARY	0.30%	NEW ZEALAND	0.08%
BELGIUM	2.31%	LITHUANIA	0.28%	ALBANIA	0.06%
MEXICO	1.79%	ROMANIA	0.28%	GUERNSEY	0.06%
PANAMA	1.75%	COSTA RICA	0.23%	JERSEY	0.06%
DENMARK	1.71%	TÜRKIYE	0.21%	MALAYSIA	0.05%
CYPRUS	1.45%	ECUADOR	0.20%	INDIA	0.05%
SINGAPORE	1.41%	BULGARIA	0.20%	ERITREA	0.05%
NORWAY	1.39%	LATVIA	0.20%	ICELAND	0.05%
AUSTRIA	1.24%	SLOVAK REPUBLIC	0.17%	HOLY SEE	0.05%
GIBRALTAR	1.04%	CURAÇAO	0.17%	QATAR	0.05%
BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS	1.02%	JAPAN	0.16%	GREECE	0.05%
MALTA	0.99%	CAYMAN ISLANDS	0.16%	SEYCHELLES	0.04%
IRELAND	0.88%	BRAZIL	0.16%	REUNION	0.04%
URUGUAY	0.76%	VENEZUELA	0.15%	SOUTH AFRICA	0.03%
HONG KONG	0.69%	ARGENTINA	0.14%	UKRAINE	0.03%
CHILE	0.65%	MOROCCO	0.14%	MONACO	0.03%
CHINA	0.62%	BAHAMAS	0.13%	KOREA	0.03%

Source: Register of Beneficial Ownership at the Commercial Register

With regard to **foreign legal structures**, as noted above, Spain did not sign the Hague Convention of 1 July 1985; therefore, whilst entities incorporated abroad may operate, they must be incorporated as legal persons.

The presence of foreign legal persons would therefore be understood indirectly, as they have previously been incorporated as legal persons, regardless of whether they are resident within the European Union, since they are eligible for the one-stop shop scheme, as explained in the preceding paragraphs.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that foreign legal arrangements without legal personality that have a presence in Spain must obtain a Tax Identification Number (TIN) and file a return for Non-Resident Income Tax in Spain under a legal regime similar to that applicable to permanent establishments of non-resident legal entities. If they have no presence in Spain, the income will be allocated proportionally to their members, who must then fulfil their respective tax obligations.

In any event, the data available as of the reporting date indicate that the presence of trusts is clearly limited. Based on information obtained from the Notarial Centralised Prevention Body, an analysis of 59,397 transactions carried out since 2006 identified the actual involvement of a trust in only 83 cases. None of these cases involved a trust acting directly before a notary. Instead, in 81 cases, the trust formed part of the ownership chain of another foreign legal entity, acting as an intermediary vehicle.

Finally, of the data obtained from the Register of Corporate and Fiduciary Service Providers, only six stated, at first glance, that they carried out fiduciary service management activities. However, when additional information was requested regarding the details provided by those who reported the highest number of operations, they stated that the declaration had been erroneous due to a lack of knowledge, which demonstrates the residual nature of these operations in relation to the total volume of activities.

5. Threats

The analysis of threats associated with LPLA enables the identification of patterns of abuse linked to the concealment of the identity of ultimate beneficial owners, the use of opaque structures, cross-border operations and the use of new technologies that facilitate anonymity.

Firstly, when we speak of the use of companies for ML/TF purposes, this can take three forms:

- Gradual use: criminals use the entity as a vehicle to channel funds under the guise of the company's industrial or commercial activity, pretending that the company has a greater volume of business than it actually does, and in most cases mixing funds of both lawful and unlawful origin. Normally, this approach will be more long-term in nature, as it allows funds generated over time to be laundered, with small amounts being incorporated as if they were the proceeds of commercial activity, and in many cases gradually increasing the funds of illicit origin.
- One-off use: this involves using the entity as a vehicle to obtain a simulated capital gain through the purchase and subsequent sale of the same asset, usually a property (due to its high value) or financial assets (due to the difficulty in determining their true value). Generally, this method consists of the legal entity purchasing an asset and subsequently selling it at a price different from the purchase price. This capital gain is not genuine, as it is based on two transactions in which at least one of the prices is manifestly lower or higher than market prices, since they are agreed between the parties to generate it artificially; one way of lending credibility to the transactions that generated this price difference is to formalise the sales in a public document (even to register them in the land registry, which will allow funds of illicit origin, disguised as this capital gain, to be integrated into the entity's assets).
- Final purpose: this involves using the company or legal structure merely as a vehicle for holding or owning assets in the entity's name. Generally, this approach aims to make the person or legal structure the registered owner of certain assets, thereby acting as a veil that conceals the natural person who actually possesses the funds or benefits from the asset.

This section sets out the main characteristics identified in reports from regulated entities, financial intelligence reports, judicial and police investigations, and final judgements involving individuals and legal entities, distinguishing between those incorporated in Spain and those incorporated abroad, in accordance with the FATF guidelines on threat and risk assessment.

An analysis has been carried out of suspicious transactions and financial intelligence reports involving Spanish and foreign individuals and legal entities. This analysis reveals the following data for the period 2020–2024:

Table 6. Estimate of legal persons involved in suspicious transaction reports and financial intelligence reports

	Suspicious Transaction Reports	Financial intelligence reports
Percentage of legal persons compared to natural persons	30%	32.75%
Country of incorporation of the legal persons included	**Highest proportion** United Kingdom: 9.7% Panama: 6.3% Netherlands: 5.1% **Other notable countries** United Arab Emirates: 4.4% British Virgin Islands: 2.4% Andorra: 2.4% Gibraltar: 1.7%	Spain: 60% Most common from other countries: the United Kingdom, Portugal, Germany and the Netherlands
Most common offences include	Money laundering: 35% Tax offences: 32% Organised crime: 14% Fraud and scams: 5% Terrorism: 4% Corruption: 4%	Money laundering: 47% Offences against the Treasury: 20% Organised crime: 15% Fraud and scams: 12% Terrorism: 6% Corruption: 6%
Types of legal persons reported and included in financial intelligence reports	The most common are limited liability companies (92.7 per cent), followed by public limited companies (3.5 per cent), non-resident entities (2 per cent) and associations (0.5 per cent)	The most common are limited liability companies (92.13 per cent), followed by public limited companies (3.60 per cent), Spanish entities without a tax identification number (1.70 per cent) and non-resident entities (1.3 per cent)
Corruption offences	67 per cent of suspicious transaction reports linked to corruption involve legal entities	77 per cent of all financial intelligence reports linked to corruption involve legal entities
Volume of funds involved in the operations	Information not available	The volume of funds involved in the operations analysed in these reports stands at over one million euros (an average of 45% over the period analysed). When compared with the total number of intelligence reports, this figure would represent 29% of the funds affected by the operations.

5.1 Threats to entities incorporated in Spain

Between 2020 and 2024, the vast majority of legal persons included in suspicious activity reports in Spain were limited liability companies, accounting for 92.7 per cent of the total. With regard to public limited companies, there are indications of links to suspicious activity in 3.5 per cent of the suspicious transaction reports received. The remaining legal forms have a negligible presence, with percentages below 1 per cent in all cases.

During the same period, the financial intelligence reports issued show a clear concentration on limited liability companies, which account for 92.13 per cent of the entries in these reports. Next, but at a much lower percentage, are public limited companies (3.60 per cent), followed by other legal forms, which have a very low incidence, with percentages below 0.5 per cent.

The significance of limited liability companies in relation to national threats is confirmed by the requests made to the Centralised Prevention Agency, Órgano Centralizado de Prevención (hereinafter, OCP) by the authorities carrying out investigative and analytical work. Between 2021 and 2025, the vast majority of direct requests to the OCP focused on limited liability companies, totalling 195,636 requests (90 per cent of the total), followed at a considerable distance by public limited companies (30,469 requests, accounting for 8 per cent of the total). These figures are similar to those also confirmed by the CRAB regarding enquiries from authorities for the period 2021–2025. Requests from tax authorities predominate (65 per cent of requests concerning limited liability companies and 78 per cent concerning public limited companies), far outnumbering those made by authorities involved in the fight against money laundering and the financing of terrorism (which account for 27 per cent of requests concerning limited liability companies and 17 per cent concerning public limited companies), followed by requests from other authorities. The remaining legal forms account for much smaller volumes, confirming their marginal significance within the total number of requests recorded.

Authorities involved in the fight against money laundering, such as the Guardia Civil, have identified, in their investigations between 2020 and 2024, 250 legal persons in investigations initiated following reports from SEPBLAC and 1,124 legal persons in investigations initiated on their own initiative.

An analysis of the judgements handed down (see Annex V) identifies the use of legal persons as instruments of money laundering—through the conduct of apparent or even genuine commercial activity serving to conceal funds of illicit origin—as the main threat. The use of limited companies predominates as vehicles for channelling money derived from offences identified in the 2026 National Risk Assessment (NRA) – such as drug trafficking, tax fraud, fraud or smuggling – through mechanisms such as cash deposits in instalments, the purchase of property or vehicles, capital increases, sham loans or fictitious invoicing. Furthermore, there is a recurring pattern of setting up companies with no real business activity or with formal structures that do not correspond to their economic capacity, as well as the use of frontmen to conceal beneficial ownership. Other notable practices include the simulation of commercial relationships, accounting manipulation and the use of specific sectors (property, hydrocarbons, trade or the automotive industry) to launder illicit funds.

The above data show that limited companies account for the majority of cases linked to money laundering and terrorist financing. Factors such as the ease with which they can be incorporated, certain limitations in their control mechanisms and low capital requirements contribute to this outcome. Furthermore, this conclusion is consistent with the fact that this is the most common

type of legal entity in our country. It has been found that, in certain cases, these types of companies have been incorporated with contributions of assets such as computers or furniture.

The corporate purpose stated in the articles of association of the identified cases was property development; construction and renovation; the sale and purchase of vehicles and machinery; brokerage, organisation and comprehensive management of freight transport at national and international level; art and antiques; the sale and purchase of second-hand clothing and mobile phones; wholesale trade in food products; or trade in fuels, minerals and industrial chemicals.

The professional activities considered to pose the greatest risk are the incorporation of companies, capital increases or reductions, and the contribution or transfer of property. The financial sector has observed an increase in fraud and scams, as well as greater use of complex corporate structures to launder funds or evade tax.

For the non-financial sector, the greatest threats linked to entities incorporated in Spain centre on the use of shell companies, mainly asset-holding and property companies, as well as entities engaged in simulated economic activity, used to channel illicit funds or launder proceeds from economic crimes.

From a terrorist financing (TF) perspective, the Law Enforcement Agencies carried out investigations in which the following were identified Predominantly private limited liability companies, although a limited number of cases involve cooperative societies, associations and civil partnerships. Although the main criminal activity is terrorist financing, links were observed to underlying offences such as membership of organised crime, tax fraud, document forgery and smuggling.

Consistent patterns have been identified in the use of front companies and structures with multiple layers of ownership; for instance, in one TF investigation, operations were examined where there were links to a corporate structure based in Denmark.

Practices have been observed such as the buying and selling of commercial companies with the aim of concealing the ownership of these firms through constant changes in the beneficial owner, as well as cases where companies engaged in genuine economic activity come to be controlled by other individuals without any changes being made to the company register, or where they begin to channel funds from an activity other than their stated corporate purpose.

In the case of testamentary trusts, there is no evidence of complex structures or front companies.

5.2 Threats relating to entities incorporated abroad

Between 2020 and 2024, taking into account data relating to entities with a Tax Identification Number, just over 0.8 per cent of suspicious transaction reports involved transactions with non-resident companies. Over the same period, this percentage stood at 0.06 per cent for these non-resident companies in financial intelligence reports.

In addition to reports relating to entities with a Tax Identification Number (TIN), during the period in question, 11,266 undocumented foreign legal persons were identified, accounting for 18.06 per cent of all references to legal entities. Their presence increases considerably when intelligence reports are taken into account, as 33,558 undocumented foreign legal persons were mentioned in financial intelligence reports – that is, 24.91 per cent – reflecting a very significant

proportion, second only to limited companies. Particularly noteworthy are entities incorporated in the United Kingdom (9.7 per cent), Panama (6.3 per cent) and the Netherlands (5.1 per cent), alongside other jurisdictions of interest such as the United Arab Emirates (4.4 per cent) or territories considered high-risk such as the British Virgin Islands and Andorra (2.4 per cent each), as well as Gibraltar (1.7 per cent). In financial intelligence reports, the most frequently mentioned foreign jurisdictions include the United Kingdom, Portugal, Germany and the Netherlands, which indicates a concentration in certain recurring international environments.

In investigations carried out in Spain, it has been observed that the majority of foreign legal persons involved have an organisational structure similar to that of a Spanish limited liability company.

From the Central Bank's perspective, in money laundering investigations conducted by the Guardia Civil, foreign legal persons have a limited presence (163 cases in total), concentrated almost exclusively in investigations initiated on the Guardia Civil´s own initiative (160), whilst those arising from reports by SEPBLAC account for barely 3 cases.

These entities come from a wide range of geographical locations, notably European countries such as Portugal, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, alongside non-EU and high-risk jurisdictions such as Panama, the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria. Over the period, there was a notable spread of countries, reflecting the international dimension of the schemes under investigation, although the volume was significantly lower than that of domestic legal entities.

From a terrorist financing perspective, the LEAS have provided information on four companies. The main countries of incorporation identified in these cases are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany, Bosnia and Belgium. However, in investigations specifically linked to the financing of terrorism, the use of legal persons operating under the trade name *'trading'* and incorporated in Dubai, as well as in Jordan, Lebanon and Türkiye, has been detected. Furthermore, the existence of subsidiaries of these organisations operating from Libya has been confirmed; these also adopt legal forms analogous to limited companies, and their stated corporate purpose includes activities in the fuel trade, construction and property, as well as the import and export of clothing and food products.

In the court rulings handed down (see Annex V), the threat centres on the use of international jurisdictions and complex corporate structures to hinder the traceability of funds and oversight by the authorities. There is evidence of the use of bank accounts opened by companies incorporated in jurisdictions such as China, Panama or Portugal to channel international transfers, repatriate funds or carry out investments. These structures are found to be combined with Spanish companies, creating chains of ownership and transactions that obscure the illicit origin of the funds. Furthermore, fraudulent export/import schemes, disguised cross-border transfers, the use of migration or commercial networks, and the rapid movement of capital to circumvent freezes have been detected. The international dimension significantly increases the risk by introducing factors such as limited legal cooperation in several of the identified jurisdictions and regulatory differences.

As regards the factors—identified by the working group, in which the private sector participates—that influence the threats to entities incorporated abroad, mention is made of the difficulty in verifying information on beneficial ownership, the use of multi-tiered structures designed to fragment the traceability of funds, and the possible injection of illicit capital through capital increases, intra-group loans or manipulated commercial transactions.

From the private sector's perspective, there is a notable consistency between the high-risk jurisdictions identified and the countries detected in investigations by the LEAS. In particular, sectors such as notarial and registry services agree in identifying countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Panama, which also feature repeatedly in money laundering investigations. Similarly, jurisdictions such as the United Arab Emirates and Cyprus, highlighted by various professionals as high-risk environments, are reflected in police investigations, reinforcing the consistency between the two sources.

However, from a financial intelligence (FI) perspective, the LEAS identify greater geographical diversification in their operational practice, incorporating countries such as Nigeria, Bosnia and Lebanon. Overall, this comparison highlights that the main risk areas identified by professionals largely coincide with the reality of investigations, although the latter has a broader and more dynamic scope.

With regard to TF, the State Security Forces and Corps conducted investigations in which they identified legal entities similar to Spanish private limited liability companies, primarily located in Belgium and Italy. In addition, information was obtained on the operations of a small number of single-member companies incorporated in the Netherlands.

The main methods used to channel funds are through traditional bank transactions, where fictitious transactions are sometimes identified. Furthermore, there is evidence of cases involving countries with little or no international cooperation acting as intermediaries – countries which are not usually the final destination of the transfers – as well as the use of frontmen or third parties and, in some cases, the acquisition of pre-incorporated companies.

6. Main vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities are defined as those issues that can be exploited by the threat or that may support or facilitate its activities. Taking into account the pull factors set out in the *'Money Laundering Risk Assessment Tool for Individuals and Legal* Entities' developed by the World Bank (2022)[16] , general vulnerabilities will be grouped into sector-related vulnerabilities and geographical vulnerabilities, whilst vulnerabilities arising from the entity's characteristics will be analysed for each type of person and legal structure, examining aspects relating to incorporation, transparency of beneficial ownership, transparency of management, financial transparency and transparency arising from the declared activity.

Without prejudice to the specific features identified for each type of legal person and structure in the individual analysis, general aspects that affect all types of legal persons equally are set out below.

6.1 Vulnerabilities associated with the sector

6.1.1 Vulnerabilities associated with the regulatory framework of the sector

High number of inactive entities

The characteristics of Spanish commercial legislation mean that there is a significant number of inactive entities registered in the Commercial Register. Thus, around 57 per cent of entities did not file their tax returns, whilst around 65 per cent did not submit annual accounts[17] .

Entities that fail to comply with the obligation to file annual accounts for a financial year are automatically subject to the closure of their registration entry in the Commercial Register (around 60 per cent of entities)[18] . The tax authorities may deregister or revoke an entity's tax identification number if it fails to submit corporation tax returns for three consecutive periods or if it fails to file accounts with the Commercial Register for four consecutive years[19] . Since 2020, and following the 2019 Global Transparency Forum report, efforts to clean up the register have been stepped up, leading to an increase in actions aimed at revoking tax identification numbers and striking inactive or non-compliant entities off the register, thereby strengthening

[16] https://star.worldbank.org/publications/legal-persons-and-arrangements-money-laundering-risk-assessment-tool

[17] Compliance with these obligations is monitored by the Tax Agency, the Commercial Registrar and the National Audit Office, respectively.

[18] The closure of the company's register entry is public information accessible online, which entails (1) the inability to register any legal acts, except for documents relating to the termination or resignation of directors, managers, managing directors or liquidators, the revocation or resignation from powers of attorney, the dissolution of the company, the appointment of liquidators and entries ordered by a judicial or administrative authority in the Commercial Register; and (2) restricts their ability to engage in numerous commercial activities (including the ability to obtain a loan from a financial institution or to transfer or acquire property subject to public registration).

[19] The consequences of revoking the tax identification number (TIN) would be: (1) the inability to register any document with the Commercial Register until the TIN is reinstated; (2) the inability of the entity to make or receive payments into accounts or deposits held with credit institutions; (3) the inability to obtain a certificate confirming that the entity is up to date with its tax and social security obligations; (4) third parties carrying out transactions with an entity whose TIN has been revoked may be penalised; and (5) until the entity is wound up, the obligation to file annual accounts and submit annual corporation tax returns remains in force.

control mechanisms over companies that may be exploited for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes.

In particular, this process has helped to reduce the number of inactive entities, especially in 2020, improving the quality of information available in public registers and making it more difficult to use opaque corporate structures to conceal beneficial ownership or channel illicit funds. Furthermore, consistency between the tax register and the Companies Register has been strengthened, contributing to greater transparency and traceability of individuals and legal entities.

En particular, este proceso ha permitido reducir el número de entidades inactivas, especialmente en 2020, mejorando la calidad de la información disponible en los registros públicos y dificultando el uso de estructuras societarias opacas para la ocultación de la titularidad real o la canalización de fondos ilícitos. Asimismo, se fortalece la coherencia entre el censo tributario y el Registro Mercantil, contribuyendo a una mayor transparencia y trazabilidad de las personas y estructuras jurídicas.

However, an entity whose registration has been closed or whose tax identification number (TIN) has been revoked continues to exist in legal terms; therefore, there is no absolute prohibition on holding assets or carrying out economic activity. This poses a vulnerability, insofar as a non-compliant entity may continue to hold assets or carry out transactions entirely abroad without needing to interact with regulated entities or Spanish authorities, and without maintaining or submitting up-to-date information on beneficial ownership and accounting records. The availability of adequate, accurate and up-to-date information on the beneficial ownership and accounting records of these entities may not be guaranteed.

As of 31 December 2024, there were 1,217,008 companies recorded in the Commercial Register with their registration file provisionally closed due to failure to comply with annual accounts filing requirements or as a result of a provisional closure order issued by the Tax Authority (excluding dissolved entities). By 31 December 2025, this figure had fallen to 1,154,481 companies. This trend reflects a moderate improvement in compliance with corporate and tax obligations, as well as the regularisation of the registration status of some of these companies.

6.1.2 Vulnerabilities arising from the identification of the ultimate beneficial owner

Although regulatory measures are in place to enhance transparency, vulnerabilities persist in relation to the use of opaque structures, such as bearer shares that have not yet been converted or foreign companies with nominee shareholders. These practices facilitate anonymity and make it difficult to trace beneficial ownership. In particular, the **use of frontmen** allows the identity of the true owners and the illicit origin of funds to be concealed through intermediary natural or legal persons.

This is a cross-cutting risk affecting various sectors, but particularly those engaged in professional activities such as lawyers and advisers who may, knowingly or unknowingly, participate in the design and establishment of opaque legal arrangements that conceal the beneficial owner, as well as in the preparation of financial statements to be submitted to the commercial authorities.

Furthermore, vulnerabilities persist in relation to the transfer of shares and equity interests in commercial companies, particularly when such transactions are formalised through private documents or carried out abroad. Given that transfers of shares in limited liability companies

and of shares in public limited companies are not, as a general rule, recorded in the Commercial Register and are mainly reflected in the companies' internal accounts, difficulties may arise in immediately identifying changes in beneficial ownership, particularly where complex corporate structures, nominee shareholders or intermediaries are involved.

6.1.3 Vulnerabilities associated with the sector of activity.

The sectors most vulnerable to the establishment and misuse of legal persons or structures in Spain include the **property sector**, the **hotel and catering sector**, and **international wholesale trade**.

The **property sector** is one of the main pillars of the national economy; the use of shell companies or complex structures to move funds of unidentified origin may undermine the sector's true purpose, particularly in geographical areas where demand for property is very high, such as Madrid, Barcelona or the Costa del Sol.

In **the hotel and catering sector**, the intensive use of cash, the possibility of frequent changes in ownership, or the use of companies that may have no real business activity but report a simulated turnover, all contribute to the potential for criminal organisations to channel illicit funds into the system. The high volume of transactions and significant capital mobility allow illicit funds to be integrated into the formal economy through seemingly legitimate corporate transactions in the wholesale and international trade sectors.

In the field of **international wholesale trade**, business dealings with high-risk jurisdictions constitute a significant factor that increases exposure to money laundering, as they introduce greater uncertainty regarding the origin of funds and the transparency of the structures involved. In this regard, Table 7 sets out the volumes of foreign trade with high-risk jurisdictions[20] , showing the percentage of this vulnerability relative to Spain's total imports and exports:

Table 7. Foreign trade with high-risk jurisdictions by Spanish legal entities.

2020		2021		2022		2023		2024	
EXPOR	IMPOR	EXPOR	IMPOR	EXPOR	IMPORT	EXPOR	IMPORT	EXPOR	IMPOR
3%	6%	3%	6%	2%	7%	2%	7%	2%	7%

Source: DataComex. Foreign Trade Statistics.

Furthermore, the **professional services and consultancy sector** faces vulnerabilities linked to the intangible nature of its activities. Shell companies, set up with nominal capital and without any real operational structure, can be used to channel transfers of funds under the guise of fees or contracts that are difficult to verify.

[20] Source: https://datacomex.comercio.es/Metadata/Index
Countries identified as high-risk are those determined by EU Delegated Regulation 2025/1184 and those included on the FATF blacklist.

The ***Fintech*** sector often acts as an intermediary and operates outside the remit of supervisory authorities. It tends to operate within more flexible legal frameworks that impose fewer requirements regarding customer identification and the verification of the source of funds. This reduced supervision makes such entities potential channels for international capital transfers with limited traceability or verification of legality.

Finally, **foundations, associations and other non-profit organisations** may be subject to abuse when they lack accounting controls and mandatory external audits. The lack of financial transparency and the possible absence of verifiable economic activity increase the risk of them being used to channel funds for illicit purposes.

6.2 Vulnerabilities arising from the country's geography

6.2.1 Vulnerabilities arising from Spain's international geostrategic position

Spain, due to its location in the south-western corner of Europe, plays a crucial geostrategic role as a gateway to Europe from Africa, Latin America and Western Asia. This privileged position makes it an international logistics, commercial, financial and property hub, which represents a significant economic advantage for the country. However, this very characteristic gives rise to structural vulnerabilities that can be exploited by criminal networks and actors involved in money laundering and terrorist financing.

This geostrategic position, coupled with the possibility for non-resident individuals and legal persons – often from jurisdictions with less stringent corporate oversight or a lack of reliable beneficial ownership registers – to set up, acquire or use Spanish companies, creates vulnerabilities both for the legitimate activities of other individuals and legal persons in Spain and for the Spanish financial system.

This dynamic increases the risk that Spanish companies, particularly those with greater structural flexibility, will be used as vehicles for opacity, allowing the interposition of foreign entities that complicate the identification of the beneficial owner or the person exercising effective control.

The historical, linguistic and economic ties with Latin America make it easier for individuals linked to countries with higher levels of organised crime, tax evasion or institutional instability to set up entities in Spain in order to channel funds into the European financial system via seemingly legitimate corporate structures.

Similarly, the geographical proximity to the Maghreb and the Sahel – regions with a proven presence of illicit financing, jihadist networks and informal fund flows – increases the risk that certain legal persons may be used as structures for financial support, fundraising or the movement of funds linked to terrorist financing, exploiting the Spanish framework for associations or weaknesses in the registration system for certain non-commercial entities.

In summary, Spain's strategic international position entails operational risks in the field of ML/TF prevention, which need to be managed through enhanced controls, international cooperation and the identification of beneficial owners of complex legal persons and structures.

6.2.2 Internal geographical vulnerabilities in Spain

The distribution of risk associated with the creation of legal persons in Spain is not uniform. There are areas of the country whose economic, social, fiscal or legal characteristics increase

exposure to the use of abusive, fictitious or manipulated legal arrangements for money laundering or terrorist financing activities.

The Costa del Sol is one of the most exposed areas in the country. This area combines high levels of international property investment with a dense concentration of companies incorporated with little operational activity, often used as shell companies or trust vehicles. Furthermore, the area has a long-standing presence of transnational organised crime networks, particularly from Eastern Europe, Latin America and North Africa, which have operated through local corporate networks to conceal illicit flows linked to drug trafficking, extortion or tax evasion.

The Campo de Gibraltar region is classified as a high-risk area due to the long-standing presence of transnational criminal organisations involved in drug trafficking and smuggling, particularly of hashish and tobacco. These organisations have established front companies in sectors such as transport, logistics and wholesale trade, with the aim of channelling profits and laundering illicit income through fictitious invoicing, sham loans or the sale and purchase of goods – a practice that has been reported in public sources[21] .

The Spanish mainland is home to a significant proportion of financial, business and legal activity, acting as an operational hub for holding companies and investment vehicles, many of which operate across various jurisdictions without having an effective physical presence. Consequently, the likelihood of companies domiciled in Madrid channelling capital of dubious origin or destination is considerable within the national context.

[21] https://cadenaser.com/nacional/2025/04/06/la-guardia-civil-desarticula-una-organizacion-de-blanqueo-de-capitales-procedentes-del-narcotrafico-e-incauta-25-millones-de-euros-cadena-ser/

7. Sectoral risk

7.1 Limited Liability Companies

Of the 3,100,000 companies that have operated in Spain, 444,000 have been wound up, leaving 2,656,000 active companies, of which approximately 1,300,000 submit accounts. Around 100,000 new companies of this type are created each year, although in 2025 the figure was around 128,000, with capital contributions totalling around 5,000 million euros annually. In 2025, 127,594 limited companies were registered in the commercial register. By sector, the creation of this type of company was most prominent in the real estate sector (accounting for almost 15.36 per cent of all entities), followed by companies engaged in wholesale and retail trade, and professional, scientific and technical activities, administrative and support services

The number of limited companies incorporated before a notary in Spain during the period 2019–2023 was 482,114.

These are limited companies that operate as legal persons separate from their shareholders, who are not personally liable for the company's debts; their liability is limited to the capital they have contributed.

The procedures for their incorporation and operation are straightforward: they must be set out in a public deed drawn up before a notary and subsequently registered with the Commercial Register. The minimum capital is one euro and the share capital is divided into shares, although there may be a single shareholder holding all the shares (Single-Member Limited Company).

The management structure is set out in the articles of association and may be carried out by a sole director, joint and several directors (where the actions of one bind all), joint directors (who must act collectively) or by a Board of Directors (comprising three or more directors).

In this type of company, shareholders have priority in the transfer of shares, which limits access by third parties. The transfer of shares may be recorded in a public document, whether Spanish or foreign, generally before a notary, but also in a judicial or administrative document, or even in a private document; however, whatever the form of the transfer, it will not be binding on the company unless it is recorded in the register of members, which is a private document, regardless of whether the transfer is recorded in a judicial, administrative, notarial or private document.

Capital increases must be formalised by a public deed and duly registered with the Companies Register. In 2025, capital increases took place in 30,000 limited companies, amounting to 20,338 million euros, figures similar to those recorded in previous years.

Limited liability companies (LLC) are obliged to have their accounts audited, subject to the exceptions set out in the Capital Companies Act[22] . Annual accounts must be filed with the Commercial Register, with penalties provided for in the event of non-compliance, such as the

[22] They must have their accounts audited unless, at the end of two consecutive financial years, they meet at least two of the following conditions: total assets do not exceed 2,850,000 euros, the net annual turnover does not exceed 5,700,000 euros and/or the average number of employees during the financial year does not exceed fifty.

company's removal from the register or a ban on contracting with the public administration – a highly effective measure.

Threats:

As this is the most common type of commercial company, given how easy it is to set up and the low capital outlay required, it accounts for the majority of cases linked to money laundering and terrorist financing. It has been observed that, in certain cases, these types of companies have been incorporated with contributions of assets such as computers or furniture; monitoring these contributions is complicated, as this type of contributed asset generally lacks the details required for its unequivocal identification.

Thus, 92.7 per cent of references to legal persons in suspicious transaction reports were to limited liability companies, whilst 92.13 per cent of references to legal persons in financial intelligence reports related to this type of company. However, if we take into account the total number of limited liability companies, and specifically the estimated number of companies that are actually active, it can be seen that there is no real preponderance of such companies in suspicious transaction reports, particularly when compared with public limited companies. The data obtained regarding enquiries to the Notarial OCP and the CRAB yield similar results (see Annex V).

As regards ML/TF investigations in which limited liability companies featured, the corporate purpose stated in the articles of association of the identified cases was property development; construction and renovation; the sale and purchase of vehicles and machinery; brokerage, organisation and comprehensive management of freight transport at national and international level; art and antiques; the sale and purchase of second-hand clothing and mobile phones; wholesale trade in food products; or trade in fuels, minerals and industrial chemicals.

In this regard, a notable threat is the provision of remote 'turnkey' company formation services for foreign nationals, which can also be incorporated without physical presence, thereby increasing the likelihood of concealing the beneficial owner and of the company not being intended for any genuine business activity. It should be borne in mind that, as a vulnerability, Spain is an attractive destination for the **incorporation of companies by non-residents** thanks to its stable economic environment, its strategic location and its membership of the European Union. This service may have the following implications:

1. The formation of companies with no economic purpose, which act merely as intermediary vehicles for holding assets, accounts or international transfers.
2. The difficulty in verifying foreign documentation and identifying beneficial owners (particularly when they reside outside Spain) limits the effectiveness of due diligence carried out by notaries, registrars, tax advisers and financial institutions.
3. There is a risk that independent professionals may be used as frontmen or as vehicles for money laundering and illicit financing.

The fact that they are easy to set up also contributes to their use for money laundering. In this regard, SEPBLAC has recently identified the use of 'mule' accounts by limited companies which, represented by foreign nationals, receive transfers from abroad – originating from fraud or other criminal activities – and then transfer the funds back abroad.

Given their characteristics, civil partnerships could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in the forms of final-purpose use, gradual use and one-off use.

Vulnerabilities:

- This is the most common type of legal entity, which makes it possible to conceal transactions of illicit origin amongst a large number of legitimate transactions. This characteristic stems from the minimum capital required for its incorporation, 3,000 euros (although it is possible to incorporate companies with a minimum contribution of 1 euro under certain conditions).
- There is no general limit on the number of companies that a single natural or legal person may incorporate or control; therefore, given the low initial outlay required for incorporation, the accumulation of companies may constitute a risk factor when certain circumstances arise, such as the mass incorporation of companies within a specific timeframe. Mechanisms can be used that lead to *the* so-called *'telescope effect',* whereby a single amount of share capital, when divided into several parts, can be used to incorporate many companies.
- Although there are legal restrictions on the transfer of shares, these are relatively flexible, which maintains a moderate risk of opacity regarding beneficial ownership, particularly where the company is a sole proprietorship, thereby reducing the number of beneficial owners who must be identified and facilitating the use of front owners.

The requirements for setting up such a company are very straightforward, making it easily accessible. Furthermore, subject to certain conditions, it is possible to incorporate the company before a notary without physical presence and with very little share capital. Moreover, there is no requirement to verify the reliability of the contribution made towards the subscription.

- As regards vulnerabilities arising from a lack of transparency in management, they present a risk by allowing the appointment of nominal directors, which makes it easier for apparent management to fall to individuals with no real role, interposing figures who conceal the ultimate decision-maker. Added to this is the fact that a legal entity may be appointed as a director, which allows for a chain of entities and complicates the control structure, making it difficult to identify the actual management body.
- Although there is an obligation to prepare and submit annual accounts, in many cases there is no audit requirement unless certain financial thresholds are exceeded, which may allow significant activities to remain without independent external scrutiny.
- As regards the declared business activity, there are no strict material limits on the corporate purpose that may be declared, allowing for the inclusion of a wide range of activities; this, combined with their profit-making nature, increases the risk of the entity being used for illicit purposes and creates a risk area in relation to AML/CFT by making it difficult to detect discrepancies between the declared and actual activities.

Inherent risk

Limited companies, being by far the most numerous, are also more commonly found in corporate structures set up for ML/TF purposes.

On the one hand, there are instances where limited companies may be at greater risk of being used for illicit purposes, in particular:

- **Limited company in the process of formation**. Until its incorporation – that is, until its mandatory registration with the Commercial Register – and therefore from the time the notarial deed is executed until its registration with the register, the company is in the process of formation and has not yet acquired legal personality, although it may be used by its members for certain business purposes, such as the purchase of property or shares or holdings in other companies, as it may begin to operate from the moment the deed of incorporation is executed, since it has the necessary tools to engage in commercial transactions (a bank account and a provisional tax identification number).
- **Limited Liability Company that has become irregular**. If one year has elapsed since the execution of the deed without an application for registration having been made, these companies become irregular and the rules governing general partnerships or, where applicable, those governing civil partnerships will apply if the company in the process of formation has commenced or continued its operations. In such cases, the risk would be lower, as the company would lose its provisional tax identification number (TIN) and would not be able to hold a bank account due to the controls implemented by credit institutions.
- **Limited company not listed in the AEAT's Register of Entities** (tax identification number revoked). The AEAT may order provisional removal from the Register of Entities (see section 6.1.1).
- **Inactive companies.** This classification applies to companies that are incorporated but do not submit annual accounts or file tax returns. They may be used as special-purpose vehicles in certain transactions.

Furthermore, there are risks specific to this type of company, as highlighted in the 2020 NRA, notably:

- Transfers of shareholdings carried out abroad, which make it difficult for notaries to monitor and apply direct anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) measures.
- The acquisition in Spain by foreign nationals and, to a lesser extent, Spanish nationals, of immovable property in the name of dormant companies whose sole activity is the holding and management of the property. These holding companies set up for this purpose generally take the form of limited companies. Although the shareholders must be identified, either in the company's memorandum of association or in the relevant deed of transfer of shares – which is not binding on the company unless entered in the register of shareholders – it is difficult to identify the true owner of the property.
- Cases involving chains of ownership involving companies located in several different jurisdictions are used to structure the ownership of Spanish companies for various purposes, generally to conceal the company's beneficial owner or the source of the funds. The companies holding the property or assets are, in turn, other foreign companies, which are themselves owned by other companies, ultimately leading to companies registered in non-cooperative jurisdictions or those with restrictive legislation, all with the aim of ensuring the anonymity of the company's beneficial owners.

- Inactive companies that do not file annual accounts with the Commercial Register, whose structure and beneficial ownership are not fully known to the authorities. Although the Notarial Real Ownership Database contains information on these companies, they may pose a risk from an AML/CFT perspective, as they should not be carrying out any activity beyond their liquidation, dissolution and winding-up or the settlement of their commercial and tax obligations, as they generally meet the dual condition of having their entry in the Commercial Register closed and having their tax identification number provisionally cancelled by the Spanish Tax Agency (AEAT) – situations which may be known to any interested party through the publication channels established for this purpose.
- Money laundering operations involving illicit proceeds carried out through limited companies that engage in other types of legitimate activities. These activities may pose a higher risk if they routinely use cash.

Thus, information held by the public authorities reveals the creation of limited companies for unlawful purposes; in particular, these are generally companies which, despite existing controls, manage to be set up and used for the purpose of concealing the origin of the funds with which to carry out transactions; they are created for the sole instrumental or asset-related purpose of concealing assets or securities (for example, assets or property held in the name of companies) and of making it difficult to ascertain the true identity of the owner of the funds or assets.

The risks of companies being incorporated or acquired for such purposes are greater for commercial companies whose shareholders are themselves other companies. They are often incorporated in third countries and have other companies as shareholders, forming part of a chain or corporate network; this is because, despite the legal obligations to identify the beneficial owners of each such company, the verification and validation of this information cannot be carried out on the basis of data held in national databases and registers, but must rely solely on the declarations received.

In view of the above, the inherent risk associated with limited companies would be as follows:

Table 8. Inherent risk of limited companies

Type of company	ML Risk	TF Risk
Limited companies in general	**Medium-substantial**	**Medium-substantial**
Unincorporated partnerships	**High**	**High**
Companies with revoked tax identification numbers	**Substantial-high**	**Substantial-high**
Holding companies	**Substantial**	**Medium**
Dormant companies	**Substantial-high**	**Substantial-high**

Companies with complex ownership structures	**Substantial-high**	**Substantial-high**
Companies with partners who are individuals resident or domiciled in high-risk territories	**Substantial-high**	**Substantial-high**
Companies with corporate partners domiciled in high-risk jurisdictions associated with a lack of transparency	**High**	**High**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

General measures:

- **Central Register of Beneficial Ownership**: building on the framework already in place in 2020 to ensure transparency regarding beneficial ownership – which highlighted the role of the OCP Database of the General Council of Notaries and the Register of Beneficial Ownership, Registro de Titularidad Real (hereinafter, RETIR) of the Commercial Register – the creation of the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership (RCTIR) by Royal Decree 609/2023 constitutes one of the key pillars of the Spanish preventive system, centralising, harmonising and ensuring access to information on the beneficial ownership of all individuals and legal persons incorporated or operating in Spain. Furthermore, the RCTIR forms part of the European System for the Interconnection of Beneficial Ownership Registers (BORIS), which links the beneficial ownership registers of all EU countries, as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The RCTIR guarantees access to beneficial ownership information to competent authorities, obliged entities and persons with a legitimate interest, who in turn provide feedback to ensure that the information is precise, accurate and up to date.
- **The existence and operation of self-regulatory bodies** – the Anti-Money Laundering Registry Centre (CRAB) of the Spanish Association of Property and Commercial Registrars and the Centralised Prevention Agency (OCP) of the General Council of Notaries – provide an additional level of security and reliability regarding information on legal entities, their representatives and the corporate acts they carry out, thereby reducing the inherent risk associated with the creation and use of complex or potentially abusive corporate structures:
    - The commercial registrar guarantees the quality and reliability of corporate information through legality checks prior to registration, including documentary verification, independent review and verification of beneficial ownership, which helps to mitigate risks such as corporate opacity or document forgery.
    - The notary ensures the quality and reliability of information in legal transactions through a legality check prior to the execution of legal acts and transactions, which includes verifying the identity, legal capacity and authority of the parties, document verification and impartial advice. Furthermore, it incorporates the identification of the beneficial owner, thereby helping to enhance transparency and mitigate risks such as the use of opaque structures or document forgery.

- The OCP of the General Council of Notaries and the CRAB act as a centralised prevention and analysis system that integrates information from registry and notarial proceedings, respectively, regarding the identification of parties involved, document checks and the detection of suspicious transactions. This obligation reduces the inherent risk associated with the incorporation and operation of legal entities.
- The Register of Beneficial Ownership (RETIR), which forms part of the Commercial Register and is managed by its regional offices, records information on the beneficial owners of companies that file annual accounts, as well as information relating to the entities within their chain of control, provided there is a direct or indirect shareholding of more than 25 per cent.
- The Single Notarial Index is the database that brings together notarial deeds drawn up in Spain; it serves as the basis for the Notarial Real Ownership Database, which constitutes a comprehensive database on beneficial ownership accessible to various authorities with which agreements are in place[23] .

- **Supervision and sanctions relating to beneficial ownership**: the inspections carried out by SEPBLAC and, under an agreement, by the Banco de España, the Directorate-General for Insurance and Pension Funds and the National Securities Market Commission are a key element in reducing the risk associated with identifying the beneficial owner of individuals and legal entities. In this regard, since 2019, an estimated 147 inspections have been carried out to review beneficial ownership. During this period, eight infringements by regulated entities were resolved through administrative sanctioning proceedings, focusing on the verification of beneficial ownership controls, resulting in the imposition of fines totalling nearly 3.7 million euros. Furthermore, regarding the beneficial ownership declarations submitted for products reported to the FTF, in 2022 a request was made to 134 credit institutions to rectify beneficial ownership information relating to contracted products. Of these, 173,199 products corresponded to limited companies. Since then, ad hoc requests for the correction of information have been issued; failure to comply with these would trigger a supervisory alert. To date, no alerts have been issued as this request for information has been rectified within the deadline.
- To carry out any transaction with tax implications, including dealing with financial institutions, a Tax Identification Number (TIN) is required; companies with a revoked TIN are blocked or face severe operational restrictions. Article 147 of the General Regulations on Tax Administration and Inspection Procedures (Royal Decree 1065/2007) sets out the severe consequences of TIN revocation, and the Spanish Tax Agency (AEAT) periodically publishes these revoked TINs, which are entered in the Commercial Register.
- The revocation of the TIN is governed by the General Regulations on Tax Administration and Inspection Procedures (Royal Decree 1065/2007), in particular Articles 146 and 147, as well as Article 119 of the Corporation Tax Act. In summary, revocation may occur in cases of serious insolvency or liquidation; in situations of inactivity or prolonged failure to comply with formal requirements (such as the failure to file tax returns or submit accounts, the absence of business activity, or the impossibility of service of process); and in cases where the possible existence of shell companies or fictitious entities with no real economic activity is detected.

[23] SEPBLAC, the Treasury, the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office, the Anti-Drugs Prosecutor's Office, the State Prosecutor's Office, the Madrid Prosecutor's Office, the Police, the Guardia Civil, DAVA, Ertzaintza, Mossos d'Esquadra, CNI, CITCO, ORGA.

- **Mitigation measures implemented by obliged entities**: implemented using a risk-based approach, the measures taken by obliged entities enable control over the unlawful use of individuals and legal structures. We would therefore highlight:
    - The implementation of onboarding and segmentation processes that incorporate internal risk matrices which categorise customers according to various parameters (declared activity, legal form, associated jurisdiction or the complexity of the corporate structure).
    - Verification of beneficial ownership, checking the consistency between the declared ownership, the economic activity and the client's operations. This verification is particularly important in complex, *multi-company* structures or those linked to jurisdictions classified as higher risk, for which enhanced due diligence measures are applied, involving more exhaustive checks.
    - Continuous monitoring systems, supported by technological tools that enable the detection of unusual transactions or those inconsistent with the client's profile.
    - Periodic risk self-assessments, which enable internal procedures to be adjusted when significant changes in risk exposure or emerging risk patterns are detected.
    - Ongoing and specialised training for staff and management bodies, with the aim of ensuring adequate knowledge of the risks associated with individuals and legal structures, as well as of the warning signs that may indicate suspicious activity.
    - Notaries and registrars are regulated entities, meaning that corporate transactions such as the incorporation of companies, the transfer of shares, and capital increases and reductions are subject to scrutiny.
    - To carry out any transaction with tax implications, including dealing with financial institutions, a Tax Identification Number (TIN)is required; companies whose TIN has been revoked are either blocked or subject to severe operational restrictions. Article 147 of the General Regulations on Tax Administration and Inspection Procedures (Royal Decree 1065/2007) sets out the severe consequences of the revocation of a tax identification number, and the Spanish Tax Agency (AEAT) regularly publishes a list of these revoked TINs.

- **Specific measures for limited** liability **companies:** In the case of limited liability companies, the transfer of shares is governed by the legal framework set out in the Companies Act (in particular, its restricted nature in accordance with Article 107), and is usually formalised in a public deed, which reinforces the guarantees of identification, control and legal certainty of the transaction.
- In the case of shares formalised before a notary, the beneficial owner is unequivocally identified. When incorporating limited liability companies, the notary must identify each shareholder by name in the deed of incorporation.
- The oversight of acts relating to the incorporation, capital increase and capital reduction in limited liability companies is carried out through the involvement of notaries and commercial registrars, as regulated entities under Law 10/2010 of 28 April, who perform complementary functions to ensure legal compliance at the various stages of the process.
- The joint and several liability of the members of an irregular limited company (one that is not registered in the Commercial Register one year after the deed was executed before a notary) is universal, extending to all their assets.

– The law does not permit bearer shares, nor does it make any mention of nominee shareholders.

Taking into account the mitigating measures adopted, the residual risk for limited companies would be as follows:

Table 9. Residual risk of limited companies.

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Limited companies in general.	**Medium**	**Medium**
Unincorporated partnerships	**High**	**High**
Companies with a revoked tax identification number	**Substantial**	**Substantial**
Holding companies	**Medium-Substantial**	**Low-Medium**
Dormant companies	**Substantial-High**	**Substantial-High**
Companies with complex shareholding structures	**Substantial-High**	**Medium**
Companies with partners who are individuals resident or domiciled in high-risk territories	**Substantial-High**	**Substantial-High**
Companies with corporate partners domiciled in high-risk jurisdictions associated with a lack of transparency	**High**	**High**

7.2 Public limited companies

There are some 363,770 public limited companies currently registered with the Commercial Register in Spain. However, only around 33,000 submit accounts (10 per cent of the total). Certain activities, such as banking, pharmaceuticals, insurance and pension fund management, require this type of commercial company to operate. Around 450 public limited companies are incorporated each year, whilst the number of companies converting to public limited companies stands at around 70 (72 in 2025 and 61 in 2024). The number of public limited companies incorporated before a notary in Spain during the period 2019–2023 was 1,905.

These are limited companies that operate and are liable to third parties with their own legal personality, separate from that of their shareholders, who do not incur personal liability for the company's debts. The capital is divided into shares, represented by certificates or book entries.

The minimum paid-up capital is 60,000 euros and must be divided into registered or bearer shares (in the latter case, these are an absolute minority). Share certificates and provisional receipts must meet a series of requirements laid down by law:

- Relating to the company: name, registered office, share capital and identifying details.
- Relating to the characteristics of the share: nominal value, number, series, etc.
- Relating to whether the shares are registered or bearer shares.
- If the shares are registered, they must be entered in the register maintained by the company, in which successive transfers of the shares, and the possible creation of rights in rem and other encumbrances on each share, shall be recorded. The company considers a person to be a shareholder if they are registered as such in the register.

Shares may be freely transferred, subject to any restrictions laid down in the articles of association and may be listed on a stock exchange (listed public limited companies) if they meet the legally prescribed conditions, thereby allowing access to third parties; however, this consequently makes it impossible to control the presence of persons outside the company.

The transfer of shares requires the existence of a valid legal transaction and the effective transfer of the title, or the right embodied in the share, in accordance with its form of representation. However, proving ownership vis-à-vis third parties or the registration of certain acts may require the involvement of a notary or compliance with other legally prescribed formalities. The procedures for its incorporation and operation require a public deed drawn up before a notary, which must be registered with the Commercial Register. The accounting and deposit obligations are like those of limited liability companies.

Threats:

It is the second most common type of legal entity and, as such, its presence is also notable amongst cases involving the use of legal persons for unlawful purposes. Thus, 3.5 per cent of references to legal persons in communications based on circumstantial evidence were to public limited companies, whilst 3.6 per cent of references to legal persons in financial intelligence reports related to this type of company. However, if we take into account the total number of public limited companies, and specifically the estimated number of companies that are actually active, their proportion is more significant, such that they are on a par with limited liability companies. The data obtained from enquiries to the Notarial OCP and the CRAB show similar results (see Annex V).

Given their characteristics, public limited companies could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in both the gradual and one-off forms.

Vulnerabilities:

- The lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership, due to the anonymity afforded to its shareholders. Although a public limited company is incorporated before a notary and registered with the Commercial Register, its shares may be transferred by private

deed[24]. Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010 of 2 July, approving the consolidated text of the Capital Companies Act (TRLSC), permits the issue of bearer shares and does not rule out the possibility of nominee shareholders[25] .

- The requirements for setting them up are not overly complex, making them easily accessible to anyone. However, given the greater amount of capital required for their incorporation, the mass creation of public limited companies by a single beneficial owner presents less risk.

- As regards vulnerabilities arising from a lack of transparency in management, just like limited liability companies, they present a risk by allowing the appointment of nominal directors, which makes it easier for apparent management to fall to individuals with no real role, using intermediaries to conceal the ultimate decision-maker. Added to this is the fact that they may appoint a legal person as a director, which allows for a chain of entities and complicates the control structure, making it difficult to identify the actual management body.

- As regards the declared business activity, there are no strict material limits on the corporate purpose that may be declared, allowing for the inclusion of a wide range of activities; this, combined with their profit-making nature, increases the risk of the entity being used for illicit purposes and creates a risk area in relation to AML/CFT by making it difficult to detect discrepancies between the declared and actual activities.

Inherent risk

In the case of unlisted public limited companies, their use for concealing funds derived from economic crimes and corrupt activities has also been observed, although on a much smaller scale than with limited liability companies due to their lower prevalence in our country.

As with limited companies, public limited companies are more vulnerable to being used for illicit purposes at certain stages, when they are being formed, when they are in an irregular situation, or when their tax identification number has been revoked.

Vulnerabilities relating to a lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership, particularly in cases involving registered shares or bearer shares, are key factors in determining the inherent risk:

[24] Shares represented by book entries are governed by stock market regulations and allow the shareholder to be identified through accounting records; by contrast, those represented by certificates do not guarantee the identification of their holder with the same degree of precision.

[25] It is important to distinguish between the two types of share representation that may exist in public limited companies: share certificates (registered and bearer) and book-entry shares. In particular, shares represented by book entries are governed by the provisions of the regulations governing the securities market, such that they are recorded in an accounting register via a computerised file maintained by a specialised entity, which is obliged to provide the issuing company with the data necessary to identify its shareholders. By contrast, shares represented by bearer and registered certificates lack a procedure that allows the identity of the shareholder to be ascertained with certainty

Table 10. Inherent risk in public limited companies

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Listed public limited companies	**Medium**	**Low-Medium**
Public limited companies with registered shares	**Substantial**	**Low-Medium**
Public limited companies with bearer shares	**High**	**Low-Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply equally to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted

– Law 10/2010 of 28 April establishes safeguards for the control of bearer shares, as information on beneficial ownership must also be registered, whilst Regulation (EU) 2024/1624, which comes into force on 10 July 2027, prohibits them and requires their conversion into registered shares. Added to this is the fact that, although the use of bearer shares is possible, it is extremely rare in Spain, as the majority of shares are registered shares.

– There are certain controls in place regarding the appointment of nominee shareholders, insofar as the notary and the registrar are involved in corporate transactions relating to the creation and transfer of shares.

– The risk is very limited in public limited companies listed on official markets, as they are subject to exhaustive scrutiny and strict rules regarding the identity of their shareholders.

– The supervision of the incorporation, capital increases and capital reductions of public limited companies is carried out by notaries and registrars, who are designated as obliged entities under Law 10/2010 of 28 April.

– With regard to the supervision of beneficial ownership declarations for products reported to the FTF, in 2022 a request was made to 134 credit institutions to rectify beneficial ownership information relating to contracted products. Of these, 30,355 products were held by public limited companies. Since then, ad hoc requests for the correction of information have been issued; failure to comply with these would trigger a supervisory alert. To date, no alerts have been issued as this request for information has been rectified within the specified timeframe.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for public limited companies would be as follows:

Table 11. Residual risk for public limited companies

Type of company	ML Risk	TF Risk
Listed public limited companies	**Low**	**Low**
Public limited companies with registered shares	**Medium**	**Low**
Public limited companies with bearer shares	**Substantial**	**Low**

7.3 General Partnership

A civil partnership is conceived as a contract between two or more persons who undertake to pool assets, money or labour in order to carry out a profit-making activity and share the profits obtained. Its contractual nature means that, in principle, it requires neither a notarial deed nor registration in the Commercial Register, except in cases where immovable property is contributed, in which case a public deed is required.

There are two forms: the public civil partnership, which acquires legal personality and whose agreements are formalised in a public deed before a notary; and the private civil partnership, which requires neither a public deed nor registration, lacks legal personality and is subject to the community of property regime (Article 1669 of the Civil Code). For the purposes of this analysis, we shall focus on civil partnerships that acquire legal personality.

There may be three types of partners in civil partnerships. Capital partners contribute money or assets and share in profits and losses in proportion to the value of their contribution. Labour partners contribute only labour and share in the profits, without being liable for losses unless otherwise agreed, whilst mixed partners combine capital and labour.

This is a type of commercial company that is used considerably less frequently. Thus, although registration in the Commercial Register is not compulsory, there are 2,527 registered civil partnerships currently in force. Meanwhile, the number of civil partnerships incorporated before a notary in Spain during the five-year period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2023 stood at 1,958.

Threats

In line with the number of existing civil partnerships, only 0.3 per cent of references to legal persons in communications based on circumstantial evidence were to civil partnerships (with or without legal personality), whilst the figure drops to 0.18 per cent of references to legal persons in financial intelligence reports relating to this type of company. However, although this figure is well below the figures for limited companies and public limited companies, given the volume of existing civil partnerships, it is not insignificant. As regards data on enquiries to the Notarial OCP,

there were 1,022 direct requests (2021–2025), whilst the CRAB received 572 requests for the same period; when compared with the figures for the number of partnerships formed and registered partnerships currently active in the Commercial Register, this is significant. (see Annex V).

Given their characteristics, civil partnerships could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in terms of final use, gradual use and one-off use.

Vulnerabilities:

- The requirements for their formation are very straightforward, making them easily accessible; in particular, the low initial capital requirement facilitates the creation of structures with little economic substance and greater potential for concealing funds or illicit activities. Furthermore, civil partnerships can be structured as asset-holding entities, which makes it difficult to identify the origin and destination of assets.
- The formation of certain civil partnerships does not require a notarial deed or registration with the Commercial Register, except in certain circumstances (for example, the contribution of immovable property). This reduces documentary traceability and limits the preventive controls associated with notarial and registration procedures.
- Limited companies that are not registered in the Commercial Register may be regarded as irregular companies. In such cases, the rules governing general partnerships will apply when they carry out commercial activities or, where applicable, those governing unincorporated partnerships when their purpose is of a civil nature.
- The possibility that shares may be held by other legal persons complicates traceability in chain structures and makes it difficult to ascertain beneficial ownership, which can increase complexity where foreign legal persons are involved.
- Furthermore, with regard to beneficial ownership, civil partnerships are only required to maintain a register of partners at the time of registration, which results in less certainty regarding the partnership's composition. Thus, the identity of the partners can be easily concealed, particularly when they do not register and carry out few transactions before a notary or other regulated entities.
- As regards the declared business activity, there are no strict material limits on the corporate purpose they may declare, allowing for a wide range of activities to be included; this, combined with their profit-making nature, increases the risk of the entity being used for illicit purposes and creates a risk area in terms of AML/CFT by making it difficult to detect discrepancies between the declared and actual activities.
- Civil partnerships are often used in activities involving high levels of cash transactions (small-scale construction, renovations, the hospitality sector, personal services, agricultural activities, etc.), which may increase exposure to risks of income concealment, fictitious invoicing or the circulation of unjustified funds.
- They are not subject to specific regulation, being governed by the general provisions of the Civil Code and the Commercial Code.

Inherent risk

Vulnerabilities relating to a lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership influence the assessment of inherent risk:

Table 12. Inherent risk of civil partnerships

Type of partnership	ML risk	TF risk
Partnerships	**Medium**	**Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

– The unusual nature of undertaking business or economic projects without limiting the scope of the partners' liability, which makes this arrangement highly uncommon and conspicuous.

– The existence of partners' liability for the company's debts.

– The oversight of civil partnerships at the time their contract is notarised and they are registered, or when they apply for a tax identification number (TIN) from the Spanish Tax Agency (AEAT), which removes the 'anonymity' characteristic of such entities.

– With regard to the supervision of beneficial ownership declarations for products reported to the), in 2022 a request was made to 134 credit institutions to rectify information on the beneficial ownership of contracted products. Of these, 9,966 products were held by civil partnerships. Since then, ad hoc requests for the correction of information have been issued; failure to comply with these would trigger a supervisory alert. To date, no such alerts have been issued, as the requested information has been provided within the specified timeframe.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk associated with civil partnerships would be as follows:

Table 13. Residual risk for civil partnerships

Type of company	ML Risk	TF risk
Civil partnerships	**Low**	**Low**

7.4 General Partnership

General partnerships are a type of commercial partnership with a personalist nature. In such partnerships, all partners assume unlimited, joint and several liability for the partnership's debts;

consequently, should the partnership's assets prove insufficient, they must be liable with their own assets.

There are two types of partners: capital partners, who contribute assets or capital, and working partners, who contribute only their labour. At least two partners are required to form such a partnership, and partnership status is not transferable without the consent of the other partners.

A general partnership is formed by means of a notarial deed and registration in the Commercial Register, which confers legal personality upon it. No minimum capital is required. These partnerships are subject to corporation tax. As a general rule, they are not obliged to have their accounts audited or filed, unless all their partners are legal entities, in which case they are treated in the same way as limited companies.

This is a very traditional form of company, the use of which has declined over the years. Currently, there are 6,593 general partnerships with valid registration in the Commercial Register, whilst the number of general partnerships formed before a notary in Spain in the five-year period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2023 stood at 57.

Threats

The available data show little or no use of partnerships for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. According to the data provided by SEPBLAC, there was only one report based on circumstantial evidence involving a partnership during the period analysed, whilst there were no intelligence reports. Data on requests to the Notarial OCP and the CRAB reveal similar figures: a total of 17 direct requests to the Notarial OCP during the period analysed (2021–2025), whilst the CRAB received 149 requests (2021–2025). (See Annex 5).

Given their characteristics, general partnerships could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in both the gradual and one-off forms.

Vulnerabilities:

- The requirements for setting them up are minimal, which could make them attractive for transactions that need to be carried out within a short timeframe.
- The possibility that shares may be held by other legal persons complicates traceability in chain structures and makes it difficult to ascertain beneficial ownership, thereby facilitating their integration into complex legal structures.
- The possibility of internal agreements between partners and organisational flexibility may make it difficult to identify actual control arrangements, as well as a lack of transparency regarding the activities carried out or decision-making processes when these are not fully reflected in documentation accessible to third parties.
- With regard to vulnerabilities arising from a lack of transparency in management, general partnerships may appoint a legal entity as a director, which allows for a chain of entities and complicates the control structure, making it difficult to identify the actual management body.

- As regards vulnerabilities associated with financial transparency, there is no obligation to submit and audit accounts, unless all its partners are legal entities, in which case the requirements for public limited companies would apply.
- As regards the declared business activity, there are no strict material limits on the corporate purpose they may declare, allowing for a wide range of activities to be included; this, combined with their profit-making nature, increases the risk of the entity being used for illicit purposes and creates a risk area in relation to AML/CFT by making it difficult to detect discrepancies between the declared and actual activities.

Inherent risk

Vulnerabilities relating to the lack of transparency in beneficial ownership influence the assessment of inherent risk:

Table 14. Inherent risk in partnerships

Type of partnership	ML risk	TF risk
Partnerships	**Medium**	**Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted

- By virtue of the entity's very structure, it should be possible to identify the partners, thereby promoting transparency regarding beneficial ownership.
- A notarial deed is required for its incorporation.
- With regard to a lack of financial transparency, the legislation mitigates the risk by requiring that, where all its members are legal entities, they must submit annual accounts (Article 41 of the Commercial Code).
- With regard to the supervision of beneficial ownership declarations for products reported to the FTF, in 2022 a request was made to 134 credit institutions to rectify beneficial ownership information relating to contracted products. Of these, 87 products were held by partnerships. Since then, ad hoc requests for the correction of information have been issued; failure to comply with these would trigger a supervisory alert. To date, no alerts have been issued as this request for information has been rectified within the specified timeframe.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for civil partnerships would be as follows:

Table 15. Residual risk for general partnerships

Type of partnership	ML risk	TF risk
General partnerships	**Low**	**Low**

7.5 Simple Limited Partnership (SLP)

A limited partnership is a commercial entity of a personal nature that combines two types of partners: general partners, who are responsible for management and have unlimited and joint liability, and limited partners, whose liability is limited to the amount of their contribution and who do not participate in management. At least two partners must be appointed for its incorporation. There is no requirement for a minimum statutory capital.

The formation is formalised by means of a notarial deed and registration with the Commercial Register. No minimum statutory capital is required, and the capital may consist of cash, assets or rights, but it must be clearly defined. Nor is there any[26] obligation to audit or file the annual accounts.

There are currently 1,822 limited partnerships with valid registration in the Commercial Register. The number of limited partnerships incorporated before a notary in Spain during the five-year period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2023 was 14.

Threats

The available data show little or no use of limited partnerships for money laundering and terrorist financing purposes. Of the data provided by SEPBLAC, there was only one report based on circumstantial evidence involving a limited partnership, whilst there were two intelligence reports. Data on requests to the Notarial OCP and the CRAB reveal similar figures: a total of 18 direct requests to the Notarial OCP during the period analysed (2021–2025), whilst the CRAB received 99 requests (2021–2025) (see Annex V). It should be noted that the data provided refer collectively to both general and limited partnerships, as no distinction is made in their databases.

Given their characteristics, limited partnerships could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in both the gradual and one-off usage scenarios.

Vulnerabilities:

- A general partnership may be registered with the Commercial Register, although a notarial deed is not strictly required except in specific cases, such as the contribution of immovable property, or when registration is sought. In the absence of registration, there may be a lower degree of public disclosure and transparency regarding its partners and

[26] Pursuant to the provisions of Article 41 of the Commercial Code, this shall not apply to limited partnerships in which, at the end of the financial year, all partners are Spanish or foreign companies; such partnerships shall be governed by the rules applicable to public limited companies (they must have their annual accounts audited, except where they submit abridged balance sheets, and must file them with the Commercial Register).

structure. Its legal framework, in any case, involves fewer formal requirements and relatively low incorporation costs.

- The requirements for its formation are not overly complex, making it easily accessible to anyone.
- As with civil partnerships, the regulations are very general and vague in many respects, leaving their operation to be governed by the provisions of the memorandum of association.
- As regards vulnerabilities relating to financial transparency, there is no obligation to submit and audit accounts, unless all its partners are legal entities, in which case the requirements for public limited companies would apply.
- As regards the declared business activity, there are no strict material limits on the corporate purpose that may be declared, allowing for a wide range of activities to be included; this, together with its profit-making nature, increases the risk of the entity being used for illicit purposes and creates a risk area in relation to AML/CFT by making it difficult to detect discrepancies between the declared and actual activities.

Inherent risk

The limited impact of vulnerabilities influences the determination of inherent risk:

Table 16. Inherent risk in limited partnerships

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Limited partnerships	**Low**	**Low**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- The unusual nature of undertaking business or economic projects through this type of legal entity, which makes such arrangements highly uncommon and conspicuous.
- As regards the lack of financial transparency, the legislation mitigates the risk by requiring that, where all the partners are legal entities, they must submit annual accounts (Article 41 of the Commercial Code).

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk associated with limited partnerships would be as follows:

Table 17. Residual risk of limited partnerships

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Limited partnerships	**Low**	**Low**

7.6 Limited Partnership by Shares (LPbS)

A limited partnership by shares is a hybrid form of company that combines elements of partnerships and joint-stock companies. It comprises general partners, who manage the company and have unlimited liability for its debts, and limited partners, whose contribution takes the form of shares and whose liability is limited to the subscribed capital.

The company is incorporated by way of a public deed and registration with the Commercial Register. A minimum capital of 60,000 euros is required, at least 25 per cent of which must be paid up. The board of directors must necessarily comprise at least one general partner.

As the Companies Act applies, LPbS are required to have their accounts audited and filed and are subject to corporation tax.

There are currently 158 limited partnerships with share capital with valid registration in the Commercial Register. The number of limited partnerships with share capital incorporated before a notary in Spain in the five-year period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2023 was 5.

Threats

The analysis carried out in the section on Simple Limited Partnerships applies here, as the databases contain aggregated information on limited partnerships without distinction.

Vulnerabilities:

- The lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership, due to the anonymity afforded to its partners. Whilst a limited partnership by shares is incorporated before a notary and registered in the Commercial Register, its shares may be transferred by private deed.
- The possibility that shares may be held by other legal entities, which complicates traceability in chain structures and makes it difficult to ascertain beneficial ownership; this can increase the complexity when foreign legal persons are involved.
- The requirements for its formation are not overly complex, making it easily accessible to anyone.
- As regards the declared business activity, there are no strict material limits on the corporate purpose that may be declared, allowing for a wide range of activities to be included; this, together with its profit-making nature, increases the risk of the entity being used for illicit purposes and creates a risk area in terms of AML/CFT by making it difficult to detect discrepancies between the declared and actual activities.

Inherent risk

The existing vulnerabilities, in particular those relating to the lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership, influence the assessment of inherent risk:

Table 18. Inherent risk in limited partnerships with share capital

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Limited partnerships with share capital	**Medium**	**Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- The unusual nature of undertaking business or economic projects through this type of legal entity, which makes it a highly uncommon and conspicuous arrangement.
- Whilst in cases where there are no specific features, the regime for public limited companies applies, the particular characteristics relating to the management of the company mean that a limited partnership with share capital carries less risk than a public limited company.
- The presence of partners who are liable for the company's debts with their entire assets and who are responsible for the company's management significantly mitigates the risk.

Taking into account the existing risk mitigants, the residual risk of limited partnerships with share capital would be as follows:

Tabla 19. Residual risk of limited partnerships with share capital

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Limited partnerships with share capital	**Low**	**Low**

7.7 Cooperative Society (CS)

Cooperatives are organisations formed by natural or legal persons who join on a voluntary basis and may leave at any time, with the aim of meeting common economic and social needs through a jointly owned and democratically managed enterprise.

Their operation is based on the principles of participation, equality and solidarity, which links them directly to the social economy.

Their incorporation requires a notarial deed and registration in the Register of Cooperatives, upon which they acquire legal personality. Various types of cooperatives may be established,

such as worker cooperatives, consumer cooperatives, agri-food cooperatives, service cooperatives, housing cooperatives, credit cooperatives and educational cooperatives, amongst others.

The share capital consists of members' contributions; there is no fixed minimum capital, as this depends on the provisions of the articles of association.

Members have limited liability to the extent of their capital contributions. For tax purposes, they may be classified as 'protected' or 'specially protected' cooperatives, which entitles them to certain tax benefits.

According to data from the Ministry of Labour and Social Economy[27], in December 2024 there were 11,729 cooperatives in Spain whose workers contribute to social security schemes other than the standard one, and 6,777 cooperatives comprising solely self-employed workers. The number of cooperatives incorporated before a notary in Spain during the five-year period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2023 was 5,767.

Threats

According to data provided by SEPBLAC for the period 2020–2024, 0.16 per cent of suspicious transaction reports relating to legal persons included cooperative societies, whilst 0.14 per cent of references to legal persons in financial intelligence reports concerned this type of company. Data on requests to the Notarial OCP do show higher figures: 2,264 direct requests during the period analysed (2006–2025), making them the fourth most frequently requested type of legal person, whilst the CRAB received 1,539 requests (2021–2025) (see Annex V).

Given their characteristics, cooperative societies could be exploited for money laundering and terrorist financing in terms of gradual exploitation.

Vulnerabilities:

- The possibility that shares may be held by other legal entities, which complicates traceability in chain structures and makes it difficult to ascertain beneficial ownership; this can increase complexity where foreign legal persons are involved.
- The requirements for their formation are not overly complex, nor is a minimum share capital required, making them easily accessible to anyone.
- As regards the declared business activity, there are no strict material limits on the corporate purpose that may be declared, allowing for a wide range of activities to be included; this, combined with its profit-making nature, increases the risk of the entity being used for illicit purposes and creates a risk area in terms of AML/CFT by making it difficult to detect discrepancies between the declared and actual activities.

[27] Social Economy Entities registered with Social Security. Ministry of Labour and Social Economy

Inherent risk

Despite the existing vulnerabilities, their specific nature means that the inherent risk is considered to be low:

Table 20. Inherent risk of cooperative societies

Type of cooperative	ML risk	TF risk
Co-operative societies	**Low**	**Low**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- Their specific nature and the purpose for which they are established, which substantially limits their use.
- A notarial deed is required for their incorporation and registration in the relevant register.
- Ownership may only be transferred to another partner.
- With regard to the supervision of beneficial ownership declarations for products reported to the FTF, in 2022 a request was made to 134 credit institutions to rectify beneficial ownership information relating to contracted products. Of these, 5,523 products were held by cooperative societies. Since then, specific requests for the correction of information have been issued; failure to comply with these would trigger a supervisory alert. To date, no alerts have been issued as this request for information has been rectified within the deadline.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for cooperative societies would be as follows:

Table 21. Residual risk for cooperative societies

Type of cooperative	ML Risk	TF Risk
Co-operative societies	**Low**	**Low**

7.8 Economic Interest Group (EIG)

An economic interest grouping is an entity with its own legal personality, comprising at least two members (natural or legal persons), whose purpose is not to generate a profit for itself, but to improve the results of its members through cooperation. It is commonly used as a form of collaboration between companies wishing to strengthen certain ancillary activities, without the aim of making a direct profit.

No minimum capital is required for its formation. The members are personally, jointly and severally liable for the association's debts. They are formed by a notarial deed and registration in the Commercial Register.

There are currently 6,501 EIGs with valid registration in the Commercial Register, whilst the number of EIGs incorporated before a notary in Spain during the five-year period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2023 stood at 2,971.

Threats

The available data do not indicate that EIGs are being used for ML/TF purposes. Thus, in the data provided by SEPBLAC, there was no reference whatsoever to economic interest groups in suspicious transaction reports or in financial intelligence reports. The data provided by the Notarial OCP and the CRAB show similar results.

Given their characteristics, economic interest groups could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in a gradual manner.

Vulnerabilities:

- With regard to vulnerabilities arising from a lack of transparency in management, they present a greater risk by allowing the appointment of nominal directors, which facilitates a situation where apparent management falls to individuals with no real role, using intermediaries to conceal the ultimate decision-maker. In addition, they can appoint a legal person as a director, which allows entities to be linked together and complicates the control structure, making it difficult to identify the actual management body.
- The requirements for setting them up are not overly complex, nor is a minimum share capital required, making them easily accessible to anyone.
- As regards the declared business activity, there are no strict material limits on the corporate purpose that may be declared, allowing for a wide range of activities to be included; this increases the risk of the entity being used for instrumental purposes and creates a risk area in terms of AML/CFT by making it difficult to detect discrepancies between the declared and actual activities.
- Due to its characteristics, it may facilitate tax avoidance, as it is taxed under the tax transparency regime.

Inherent risk

Despite the existing vulnerabilities, their specific characteristics mean that the inherent risk is considered to be low:

Table 22. Inherent risk of economic interest groups

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Economic Interest Groups	**Low**	**Low**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- EIGs could be set up within corporate structures, but the grouping may not hold shares in companies that are members of the entity itself.
- It is established for a specific purpose, which facilitates its monitoring.
- They are created by means of a public deed registered with the Commercial Register, and it is not possible to transfer shares, ensuring transparency regarding the entity's owners. As it is not possible to transfer ownership, the only option for members is to withdraw.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk associated with economic interest groupings would be as follows:

Table 23. Residual risk of economic interest groups

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Economic Interest Groupings	**Low**	**Low**

7.9 Mutual Guarantee Society (MGS)

Mutual guarantee societies are financial institutions whose main purpose is to facilitate access to credit on more favourable terms for small and medium-sized enterprises, acting as guarantors and issuers of guarantees to financial institutions and other creditors. At least 80 per cent of their members must be SMEs, which benefit from the guarantees provided.

A minimum share capital of 10 million euros and a minimum of 150 members are required. The members' liability is limited.

They are subject to corporation tax and are supervised as financial institutions.

The number of mutual guarantee societies currently registered with the Banco de España´s Register stands at 18 as of 31 December 2025.

Threats

Based on the available data, there is no evidence of mutual guarantee societies being used for ML/TF purposes. Thus, according to data provided by SEPBLAC, there were no references to mutual guarantee societies in suspicious activity reports or financial intelligence reports. Data provided by the Notarial OCP and the CRAB show similar results.

Given their characteristics, mutual guarantee societies could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in relation to end-use activities.

Vulnerabilities:

- The only possible vulnerability relating to this type of company would be the very purpose for which they are established, namely the provision of guarantees.

Inherent risk

Given their characteristics, the inherent risk is considered to be low:

Table 24. Inherent risk in mutual guarantee societies

Type of association	ML risk	TF risk
Mutual Guarantee Societies	**Low**	**Low**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- Due to the very nature of the company, they do not normally feature in commercial transactions except for the purpose of achieving their stated objective (the provision of a guarantee).
- They are regarded as financial institutions, subject to prudential supervision by the Banco de España.
- The incorporation requirements are stringent.
- They are established by means of a public deed registered with the Commercial Register, ensuring transparency regarding the entity's owners.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk would be as follows:

Table 25. Residual risk for mutual guarantee societies

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Mutual guarantee societies	**Low**	**Low**

7.10 Employee-Owned Companies

Employee-owned companies are public limited companies or limited liability companies in which at least the majority of the share capital is held by employees who work for the company under a permanent employment contract. Their purpose is to encourage employee participation in the company and to promote stable employment.

They are incorporated by means of a notarial deed and registration in the Commercial Register. Their name must include the word 'Laboral'.

No shareholder may hold more than one-third of the share capital, and priority is given to employees becoming shareholders.

They are subject to corporation tax, like other commercial companies.

The number of employee-owned companies currently registered in the Commercial Register stands at 37,988.

Threats

No data is available to indicate their potential use for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes based on the information provided by SEPBLAC, the Notarial OCP and CRAB.

Given their characteristics, worker-owned companies could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in a gradual manner.

Vulnerabilities:

- As these are public limited companies or limited liability companies, the characteristics referred to therein would apply, albeit mitigated by the specific regime governing employee-owned companies and by their limitations on corporate control, as set out in the section on mitigating measures.
- The existence of more favourable tax treatment could be an incentive for their use. These tax advantages apply when certain labour or employment promotion requirements are met.
- As different types of shares or holdings (employee class and general class) coexist within the same company, it may be more difficult to establish who actually controls the entity.

Inherent risk

Given their characteristics, the inherent risk is considered low:

Table 26. Inherent risk in labour-owned companies

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Employee-owned companies	**Low**	**Low**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- Due to the very nature of the company, they do not normally feature in commercial transactions except for the purpose of achieving their stated objective.
- The status of a worker-owned company is granted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Economy.
- They are established by a notarial deed which is registered with the Commercial Register, thereby ensuring transparency regarding the entity's owners.
- Due to the nature of the entity, as the worker-members are the main owners of the entity and, in addition to exercising control over it, work within the entity itself, they will seek to protect its integrity.
- Under Law 44/2015 on Worker-Owned and Participatory Companies, no member may generally hold more than one-third of the share capital. This reduces the risk of opaque concentration of corporate control in the hands of a single person or economic group and makes it more difficult to use the company as a purely instrumental vehicle.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, and the limited use demonstrated of this type of company for AML/CFT purposes, despite the fact that they have characteristics similar to those of limited liability companies and public limited companies, the residual risk would be as follows:

Table 27. Residual risk for worker-owned companies

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Employee-owned companies	**Low**	**Low**

7.11 Corporate Joint Ventures (Corporate Joint Ventures and Equity Joint Ventures).

A corporate joint venture is a long-term joint investment agreement between two or more parties, usually entrepreneurs or legal entities, who decide to set up a company with its own legal personality and independent tax identification number to carry out a joint project. Its purpose may range from the production of goods or the provision of services to the search for new markets or cooperation at different stages of the value chain; it is of limited duration and aimed at generating financial returns.

The agreement to establish a joint venture may be formalised by means of a private or public contract, although the company on which it is based must be incorporated by means of a public document.

A corporate joint venture, unlike a contractual one, is organised around a company created specifically for this purpose or a pre-existing one, with its own legal personality and tax identification number.

The number of joint ventures currently registered in the Commercial Register stands at 3,103. In Spain, 36 joint ventures were incorporated before a notary during the period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2023.

Threats

No data is available to indicate their possible use from the information provided by SEPBLAC, the Notarial OCP and CRAB.

Given their characteristics, corporate joint ventures could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in a gradual manner.

Vulnerabilities:

- As these are public limited companies or limited liability companies, the characteristics associated with such entities would apply. Given that this is a more complex corporate structure than usual, it could make it difficult to identify the beneficial owner, bearing in mind that there may be specific agreements governing how the entity is to operate.

Inherent risk

Their characteristics mean that the inherent risk is considered to be low:

Table 28. Inherent risk: Corporate Joint Venture

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Corporate Joint Venture	**Low**	**Low**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted

- Due to the very nature of the company, it does not normally engage in commercial transactions except for the purpose of achieving its stated objective.
- The status of a worker-owned company is granted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Economy.
- They are established by a notarial deed registered with the Commercial Register, ensuring transparency regarding the entity's owners.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors and the limited demonstrated use of this type of company for ML/TF purposes, despite their similarities to limited liability companies and public limited companies, the residual risk would be as follows:

Table 29. Residual risk of corporate joint ventures

Type of company	ML Risk	TF risk
Corporate Joint Venture	**Low**	**Low**

7.12 Foundations

These are non-profit organisations established to ensure the long-term preservation of assets for purposes of general interest. They may not benefit their founders, trustees or relatives, but rather unspecified groups of people. They can be classified by their origin (public or private), by their beneficiaries (labour-related) or by their purposes (cultural, educational, welfare, environmental, development cooperation, etc.). The governing body is the Board of Trustees and they are subject to the supervision of the Protectorate.

They are established by means of a public deed, with a sufficient initial endowment (legal presumption: €30,000), and registration in the Register of Foundations, which confers legal personality upon them. They are subject to corporation tax, though they may qualify for the special tax regime applicable to non-profit organisations.

According to the data provided in the Sectoral Risk Assessment of Non-Profit Organisations, in 2023 there were a total of 15,821 foundations in Spain registered with one of the national or regional protectorates.

Without prejudice to the points outlined in the following sections, a detailed analysis of the TF risk posed by foundations can be found in the NPOs Risk Assessment, the conclusions of which are drawn upon for this analysis.

Threats

Given the characteristics of this type of entity (the letter associated with the Tax Identification Number, TIN) and the way in which the available data is grouped, the information provided by SEPBLAC, the Notarial OCP and the CRAB combines data relating to foundations, associations, political parties, trade unions and professional associations, which makes it difficult to carry out a quantitative analysis of the specific threats facing foundations.

Of the data provided by SEPBLAC, 0.5 per cent of references to legal persons in communications based on suspicion related to foundations, associations, political parties, trade unions and professional associations, whilst 0.42 per cent of references to legal persons in financial intelligence reports concerned these types of organisations. Data on requests to the Notarial OCP and the CRAB also demonstrate a certain presence of these types of organisations: a total of 2,430 direct requests to the Notarial OCP during the period analysed (2021–2025), whilst the CRAB received 2,616 requests (2021–2025) (see Annex 5).

Given their characteristics, foundations could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in both the gradual and specific forms.

Vulnerabilities:

- With regard to vulnerabilities arising from a lack of transparency in management, they may appoint a legal entity as a director, which allows for a chain of entities and complicates the control structure, making it difficult to identify the actual management body.
- As they have no members, their activities are based on contributed capital, which facilitates the anonymity of the contributors.
- As regards their incorporation, they may be established by legal persons and may participate in commercial companies.
- Certain foundations present greater vulnerabilities, in particular those involved in international projects in high-risk areas, those where the sources of funding are far removed from the geographical areas where the projects are carried out, and those with very broad or generic founding purposes.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities referred to above influence the determination of inherent risk:

Table 30. Inherent risk for foundations

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Foundations	**Medium**	**Low-Medium**

Humanitarian, educational or cultural foundations with international activities in jurisdictions at risk of TF[28]	**N/A**	**Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- Subjection to specific and proportionate measures provided for in Law 10/2010, of 28 April, and its implementing regulations, which ensure that they are aware of their risks.
- Specific controls applicable to those entities receiving public grants for the implementation of specific projects, where the public authorities are obliged to verify the implementation of such projects.
- The obligation, in certain circumstances set out in the applicable regulations (particularly where specific financial, activity or employment thresholds are exceeded, or where public grants are received), to have annual accounts subject to an external audit and to submit them to the Protectorate or the relevant public bodies, thereby promoting greater financial transparency.
- The existence of certificates or accreditations of good practice issued by an independent authority, or similar, which reduces the risk for those holding them.
- With regard to the supervision of beneficial ownership declarations for products reported to the FTF, in 2022 a request was made to 134 credit institutions to rectify beneficial ownership information relating to contracted products. Of these, 37,348 products were held by foundations and associations. Since then, ad hoc requests for the correction of information have been issued; failure to comply with these would trigger a supervisory alert. To date, no alerts have been issued as this request for information has been rectified within the specified timeframe.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for foundations would be as follows:

Table 31. Residual risk for foundations

Type of organisation	**ML Risk**	**TF Risk**
Foundations	**Low**	**Low**

[28] The classification provided is for the sole purpose of countering terrorist financing (TF), based on the analysis carried out in the Sectoral Assessment of Terrorist Financing Risks through non-profit organisations (NPOs).

Humanitarian, educational or cultural foundations with international activities in jurisdictions at risk of TF[29]	**N/A**	**Low-Medium**

In the case of humanitarian, educational or cultural foundations operating internationally in jurisdictions at risk of terrorist financing, the persistence of a residual risk higher than that of the general 'Foundations' category is explained, amongst other factors, by geographical exposure, the complexity of counterparties, the funding channels used and the potential difficulty in verifying the final destination of funds in certain contexts.

7.13 Associations

These are groups of people organised on a not-for-profit basis for a common purpose. They have their own legal personality and assets separate from those of their members. There are many different types (youth, cultural, sports, parents', students', consumer and professional associations, etc.). Their basic governing bodies are the General Assembly and the Board of Directors.

They are established by means of a founding deed and articles of association registered with the Register of Associations, although legal personality is acquired upon incorporation. They do not require a notarial deed. They are subject to corporation tax, with partial exemption, and only associations declared to be of public benefit are required to have their accounts audited.

According to data published by the Ministry of Home Affairs and included in the Sectoral Risk Assessment of Non-Profit Organisations, as of 31 December 2023 there were 66,011 associations registered in the National Register of Associations.

Without prejudice to the points outlined in the following sections, a detailed analysis of the TF risk posed by associations can be found in the NPO Risk Assessment, the conclusions of which are drawn upon for this analysis.

Threats

The analysis carried out in the section on Foundations is applicable here, as the databases contain aggregated information on limited partnerships without distinction.

Given their characteristics, associations could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing, both in terms of gradual use and specific purposes.

Vulnerabilities:

- With regard to vulnerabilities arising from a lack of transparency in management, they may appoint a legal entity as a director, which allows for a chain of entities and

[29] The classification provided is for the purposes of TF only, based on the analysis carried out in the Sectoral Assessment of Terrorist Financing Risks through NPOs.

complicates the control structure, making it difficult to identify the actual governing body.

- As regards financial transparency, they are not obliged to submit accounts, except for public-benefit associations, and are only required to have their accounts audited in very specific cases, which reduces financial oversight.
- With regard to their incorporation, they may hold shares in commercial companies.
- Similarly to foundations, certain associations are subject to greater vulnerabilities, in particular those involved in international projects in high-risk areas, those where funding sources are geographically distant from the areas where projects are carried out, those with very broad or generic founding purposes, and those that engage in economic activities or are integrated into the shareholding structure of a more complex legal entity.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities mentioned above influence the determination of inherent risk:

Table 32. Inherent risk in associations

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Partnerships	**Medium**	**Low-Medium**
Humanitarian, educational or cultural organisations with international activities in jurisdictions at risk of TF[30]	**N/A**	**Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- Subjection to specific and proportionate measures under Law 10/2010, of 28 April, which ensure they are aware of their risks.
- There is a more detailed identification of their members, due to their more personalised nature, which, in the case of foundations, reduces the risk of a lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership.
- Specific controls applicable to those entities receiving public grants for the implementation of specific projects, where the public authorities are obliged to verify the implementation of such projects.

[30] The classification provided is for the purposes of TF only, based on the analysis carried out in the Sectoral Assessment of Terrorist Financing Risks through NPOs.

- The auditing of accounts or their submission to a public body, in accordance with specific regulations.
- The existence of certificates or accreditations of good practice issued by an independent authority, or similar, which reduces the risk for those that hold them.
- With regard to the supervision of beneficial ownership declarations for products reported to the FTF, in 2022 a request was made to 134 credit institutions to rectify beneficial ownership information relating to contracted products. Of these, 37,348 products were held by foundations and associations. Since then, ad hoc requests for the correction of information have been issued; failure to comply with these would trigger a supervisory alert. To date, no alerts have been issued as this request for information has been rectified within the specified timeframe.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for foundations would be as follows:

Table 33. Residual risk for associations

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Partnerships	**Low**	**Low**
Humanitarian, educational or cultural organisations with international activities in jurisdictions at risk of TF[31]	**N/A**	**Medium-low**

7.14 Political Parties

These are a type of association subject to specific regulations that channel citizens' political participation. They must be established in accordance with democratic principles and acquire legal personality upon registration in the Ministry of Home Affairs' Register of Political Parties. Their main bodies are the Assembly, the Executive Committee and the financial control bodies.

They are established by means of a founding agreement signed by at least three people, followed by registration in the Register of Political Parties. Their tax identification number (TIN) begins with G. Their funding combines public revenue (electoral and institutional grants) and private revenue (membership fees, donations and legacies), subject to legal restrictions and oversight by the Court of Auditors.

There are 4,172 political parties registered in the Ministry of Home Affairs' Register of Political Parties.

[31] The classification provided is for the purposes of TF only, based on the analysis carried out in the Sectoral Assessment of Terrorist Financing Risks through NPOs.

Threats

The analysis carried out in the section on Foundations applies here.

Given their characteristics, political parties could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in a gradual manner.

Vulnerabilities:

- Their link to political activity and, consequently, greater exposure to the threat of corruption.
- As regards their constitution, they may participate in other types of associative bodies (foundations or associations), as well as set up commercial companies provided that the corporate purpose is consistent with the party's aims – an element that is difficult to verify in practice.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities referred to above influence the assessment of inherent risk:

Table 34. Inherent risk in political parties

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Political parties	**Medium**	**Low-Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- The existence of detailed regulations governing the financing of political parties, set out in Organic Law 8/2007, of 4 July, which regulates in detail the resources available to them—including both grants and donations—as well as their accounting and financial management obligations. Of particular note in this regard is the prohibition on anonymous donations, donations from companies holding public contracts, and donations from foreign governments.
- The various controls to which they are subject, in particular the external audit of accounts carried out by the Court of Auditors and the oversight carried out by the Register of Political Parties at the Ministry of Home Affairs as part of its day-to-day activities.
- Transparency requirements, as they are obliged to report on activities, income, expenditure, staff and contracts under Law 19/2013, of 9 December, on Transparency.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for political parties would be as follows:

Table 35. Residual risk for political parties

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Political parties	**Low-Medium**	**Low**

7.15 Trade Unions and Professional Associations

These are organisations set up to defend labour or professional interests, with their own legal personality from the moment they are entered in the relevant register (trade unions in the Register of Trade Union Organisations of the Ministry of Labour and Social Economy; professional associations in sectoral or regional registers). They operate with democratic governing bodies and financial oversight mechanisms.

They are established by means of a founding deed and articles of association, without the need for a notarial deed. Funding comes from membership fees, public grants, income from economic activities and donations. They are subject to scrutiny by the Court of Auditors if they receive public funds.

Between 2019 and 2023, 11 trade unions and 6 employers' associations were established.

Threats

The analysis set out in the section on Foundations applies here.

Given their characteristics, trade unions and professional associations could be exploited for money laundering and terrorist financing through gradual exploitation.

Vulnerabilities:

- With regard to vulnerabilities associated with financial transparency, there is no obligation to submit and audit accounts.
- Their indirect links to political activity, and consequently, greater exposure to the threat of corruption.
- As regards their incorporation, they do not require a notarised deed.
- They may participate in other types of associative bodies (foundations or associations).
- They may carry out economic activities.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities referred to influence the determination of inherent risk:

Table 36. Inherent risk for trade unions and professional associations

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Trade unions and professional associations	**Medium**	**Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- The various controls to which they are subject, in particular the external audit of accounts carried out by the Court of Auditors and the supervision carried out by the Ministry of Labour.
- Transparency requirements, as they are obliged to report on activities, income, expenditure, staff and contracts under Law 19/2013, of 9 December, on Transparency.
- The prohibition on accepting anonymous donations.
- They may not directly set up commercial companies. If they were to do so, such a company would not be considered a direct part of the trade union, but rather an external entity or a subsidiary.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for trade unions and professional associations would be as follows:

Table 37. Residual risk for trade unions and professional associations

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Trade unions and professional associations	**Low**	**Low**

7.16. Religious Organisations

These are organisations established for the purposes of worship or religious assistance, protected by the fundamental right to freedom of religion and worship. They acquire legal personality through registration in the Register of Religious Organisations maintained by the Ministry of the Presidency, Justice and Relations with the Parliament.

They are established by means of a deed or founding document and registration in the Register of Religious Organisations. They are subject to corporation tax under the partially exempt entities regime, although many enjoy tax benefits arising from cooperation agreements. According to data from the Register of Religious Organisations, as of 26 June 2026, 21,818 religious organisations were registered.

Without prejudice to the points outlined in the following sections, a detailed analysis of the TF risk posed by religious organisations can be found in the NPO Risk Assessment, the conclusions of which are drawn upon for this analysis.

Threats

Only 33 suspicious transaction reports were made during the period in relation to religious organisations, whilst the number of financial intelligence reports in which they were mentioned rose to 61. With regard to data on enquiries to the Notarial OCP, there were 73 direct requests (2021–2025), whilst the CRAB received 158 requests (2021–2025) (see Annex V).

As set out in the Sectoral Risk Assessment on NPOs, operations have been detected involving the channelling of funds towards illicit activities through informal mechanisms such as the *hawala system*, as well as international links with organisations located in conflict zones. Nine communications were identified on the basis of indications involving religious organisations on grounds of terrorist financing (TF), and one investigation in which international links were detected with other organisations established in European Union countries and in third countries located in conflict zones which, using non-bank money transfer techniques such as the *hawala system*, sent remittances to Syria.

Given their nature, religious organisations could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in both the gradual and final stages, understood as the progressive, repeated and small-scale use of the organisation to introduce, move or channel illicit funds, such that individual transactions are barely noticeable or do not trigger alerts, but which, taken together, enable the laundering or financing of illicit activities.

Vulnerabilities:

- With regard to their management, religious organisations enjoy full autonomy and may establish their own rules on organisation, internal procedures and staff regulations under Organic Law 2/1980, which makes oversight difficult.
- As regards vulnerabilities associated with financial transparency, in line with the above, there is no obligation to submit and audit accounts, without prejudice to any legal obligations arising from public grants they receive.
- In relation to their social purpose, certain religious organisations may be more susceptible to terrorist abuse, in particular those involved in international projects in high-risk areas or those working with groups susceptible to violent radicalisation.
- As regards their legal structure, they may be involved in other types of associations (foundations or societies).
- As regards their funding, the receipt of anonymous cash donations may make it difficult to trace the origin of funds.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities mentioned above influence the assessment of inherent risk:

Table 38. Inherent risk in religious organisations

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Religious organisations	**Medium**	**Low-Medium**
Religious organisations working with groups susceptible to radicalisation and/or with international activities in jurisdictions at risk of TF.[32]	**N/A**	**Substantial**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies concerning centralised prevention and supervision bodies and measures implemented by obliged entities, the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- They acquire legal personality upon registration as a religious organisation in the Register of Religious Organisations (RER), administered by the Directorate-General for Religious Freedom (Ministry of the Presidency, Justice and Relations with the Parliament).
- At the time of registration (and, where applicable, at the time of recording any changes to the details held in the register), the Directorate-General for Religious Freedom verifies compliance with the relevant statutory and legal requirements, as provided for in Royal Decree 594/2015 of 3 July.
- In cases where they receive grants or public funding under the terms set out in Law 19/2013, on Transparency, Access to Public Information and Good Governance, certain obligations regarding transparency and active disclosure may apply to their activities and the use of public funds.
- Private donations and contributions received by religious organisations, particularly those that confer tax benefits, must be properly documented and recorded in accordance with Law 49/2002, its implementing regulations and the applicable accounting and tax obligations, including, where applicable, reporting obligations to the Tax Authority.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for religious organisations:

Table 39. Residual risk for religious organisations

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Religious organisations	**Low-Medium**	**Low**

[32] The classification provided is for the purposes of TF only, based on the analysis carried out in the Sectoral Assessment of Terrorist Financing Risks through NPOs.

Religious organisations working with groups susceptible to radicalisation and/or with international activities in jurisdictions at risk of TF.[33]	**N/A**	**Medium-Substantial**

7.17 Trust

As noted in section 4.3, a trust is a legal instrument whereby a natural or legal person (the settlor) transfers formal ownership of one or more specific assets to a third party so that (until) the latter fulfils the provisions of the known as the trust agreement. The trustee must return the asset or assets in question once the obligations set out in the agreement have been fulfilled. There are different types of trust, although in practice, their use is virtually non-existent[34] .

With regard to inheritance as a form of fiducia, the testator may delegate to a trustee the power to administer and distribute the inherited assets following their death, establishing a relationship of trust that partially mirrors the relationship between settlor and trustee characteristic of Anglo-Saxon *trusts*.

However, the succession fiducia is very rarely used in Spain, due to its limited practical application and its strictly succession-related scope[35]. It is very important to emphasise that the characteristics and effects of fideicommissary substitutions are completely different from those of Anglo-Saxon *trusts* and allow them to be clearly distinguished, in particular:

- The existence of a dual or multiple succession to the enjoyment of the same assets. There are two heirs: the first heir, who is the fiduciary, and a second heir, the beneficiary.
- The existence of a duty to preserve and return the assets, imposed on the trustee for the benefit of the beneficiary, although the testator may authorise the trustee to dispose of the assets in such a way that, if the trustee disposes of them under the conditions specified or required by the testator, there may be no assets left to hand over to the beneficiary.
- The establishment of a sequential order for the acquisition of the inheritance. Thus, the testator provides that the trustee inherits first and, once a period has elapsed or a condition has been fulfilled, the assets pass to the beneficiary.

[33] The classification provided is for the purposes of TF only, based on the analysis carried out in the Sectoral Assessment of Terrorist Financing Risks through NPOs.

[34] Types of trust: (1) A trust to secure a loan or *'cum creditore',* similar to a pledge or mortgage agreement, in which the debtor transfers an asset to the creditor as security for a debt, with an obligation to return it once the debt is repaid. (2) A management trust, in which the management of the assets is entrusted to a third party (similar to a management contract). (3) Inheritance or substitution trust, in which title to the inheritance is granted to a person so that they may preserve it and transfer it to a third party (Articles 781–789 of the Civil Code). (4) Asset protection trust. In this type of trust, the assets are held in the name of a third party to protect them from potential debts, and it normally includes a reversion clause.

[35] A typical example is that of a person who dies unmarried, with no descendants or ascendants, and appoints their two siblings as trustee heirs, stipulating that upon the death of one sibling (the trustee heir), if that sibling has no descendants to inherit from them, the assets held in trust shall pass to the other sibling (the beneficiary).

Threats

Given the limited use of this arrangement, there is no evidence regarding any threats.

Due to their characteristics, trusts could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in end-use scenarios.

Vulnerabilities:

- As regards vulnerabilities relating to transparency, no public deed is required for their establishment.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities referred to influence the determination of inherent risk:

Table 40. Inherent risk of trusts

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Trust	**Low**	**Low**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply equally to legal arrangements (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- They do not have legal personality of their own and therefore cannot operate independently.
- The unusual nature – one might even say obsolete – of undertaking business or economic projects through this type of legal entity makes it a highly uncommon and conspicuous arrangement.
- The effects of the trust in Spain, which limit its use and therefore act as mitigating factors, in particular:
    - Before the condition or term under which the assets pass to the trustee is fulfilled, the trustee is a de facto heir and, as such, becomes the owner of the assets and rights subject to the substitution; and, as such an owner, acquires the use and enjoyment of the encumbered assets. 'Use' implies the possibility of utilising the property, whilst 'enjoyment' implies the right to receive the fruits it produces, whether natural (such as crops from the land) or civil (interest or income). Consequently, for all purposes, including tax purposes, the owner of the assets is the trustee, who—unless authorised by the settlor to dispose of the assets—is obliged to preserve them and transfer them to the beneficiary once the specified period has elapsed or the stipulated condition has been met.

- The trustee's acquisition of the status of heir means that they are fully identified for civil, registration and tax purposes, facilitating the traceability of ownership and reducing uncertainty regarding control over the assets.
- Once the condition or time limit set by the testator or settlor has been met, the trustee must deliver the assets to the beneficiary, making no deductions other than those necessary to pay inheritance debts and extraordinary expenses for the maintenance of the assets; from that moment onwards, the beneficiary is the owner of the assets for all purposes.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for trade unions and professional associations would be as follows:

Table 41. Residual fiduciary risk

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Trust	**Low**	**Low**

7.18. Undistributed estate

This is the status of a deceased person's estate from the time of death until the heirs accept the inheritance. Its purpose is to ensure the continuity of the estate whilst the identity of the heir is determined. It is therefore a transitional situation. One of its key features is that there is no time limit on the duration of the estate in abeyance. Furthermore, in order to obtain a Tax Identification Number (TIN), the heirs must be identified.

Threats

Given its infrequent use, there are no records of this concept in suspicious activity reports, intelligence reports or police investigations relating to ML/TF.

Vulnerabilities:

- As there is no time limit on the existence of an undistributed estate, this could, in very specific cases, lead to the statute of limitations expiring on the predicate offence.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities referred to above influence the assessment of inherent risk:

Table 42. Inherent risk of an undistributed estate

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Unrealised inheritance	**Low**	**Low**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, relating to centralised prevention and supervision bodies and the measures implemented by obliged entities, the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- They do not have their own legal personality and therefore cannot operate independently of their partners.
- No notarial deed is required; the partnership arises automatically from the time of death until the inheritance is accepted.
- To obtain a Tax Identification Number (TIN), the heirs must be identified.
- The very nature of an undistributed estate, as it requires a death to have occurred, means that preparing a will that includes this circumstance is inherently complex.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for trade unions and professional associations would be as follows:

Table 43. Residual risk of an undistributed estate

Type of organisation	ML risk	TF risk
Unclaimed inheritance	**Low**	**Low**

7.19. Contractual Joint Venture

Unlike corporate joint ventures, these are collaborative arrangements without legal personality, in which the parties manage and benefit directly from the joint activity. They are structured on the basis of a purely contractual agreement (non-standard and unregulated) without the formation of a joint company. As such, they lack their own legal personality and do not have a tax identification number.

Threats

There is no data available from the information provided by SEPBLAC, the Notarial OCP and CRAB to indicate their possible use.

Given their characteristics, contractual joint ventures could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in a gradual manner.

Vulnerabilities:

- The fact that it is a contract between the parties, the terms of which are not made public.
- The complexity of the structure: due to its characteristics and the fact that it is a private contract, there may be difficulties in identifying the beneficial owner.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities mentioned above influence the assessment of inherent risk:

Table 44. Inherent risk: Contractual Joint Venture

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Contractual Joint Venture	**Low-Medium**	**Low**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, relating to the existence of centralised prevention and supervision bodies and measures implemented by obliged entities, the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- They do not have their own legal personality and therefore cannot operate independently as they do not hold a tax identification number (TIN).
- Due to their structure, they do not normally feature in commercial transactions except for the purpose of achieving the stated objective.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk of contractual joint ventures would be as follows:

Table 45. Residual risk of contractual joint ventures

Type of company	ML Risk	TF Risk
Contractual Joint Ventures	**Low**	**Low**

7.20 Temporary Joint Venture (TJV)

This is a system of collaboration between companies whereby two or more companies or entrepreneurs join forces for a limited period to carry out a project or provide a service jointly. It is characterised by the existence of a single corporate purpose, consisting of the joint execution of the project or provision of the service. Such consortia lack legal personality of their own, distinct from that of their members, and their members are liable on a subsidiary basis for the debts of the consortium and jointly and severally amongst themselves.

Both the formation and the dissolution of Temporary Joint Ventures must be formalised by a notarial deed and may be registered in the special register maintained by the Ministry of Finance; the venture must be struck off that register upon its dissolution.

The maximum duration may not exceed twenty-five years, except in the case of contracts involving the execution of works and the operation of public services, in which case the maximum duration shall be fifty years. It bears similarities to the EIG, but unlike the latter, it has no legal personality and acts as an association to carry out a joint project on behalf of its members. It is commonly used for securing large-scale public contracts.

The number of joint ventures (TJV) incorporated before a notary in Spain during the five-year period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2023 was 18,906.

Threats

Only 24 suspicious transaction reports were made during the period in relation to Temporary Joint Ventures, whilst the number of financial intelligence reports in which they were mentioned rose to 43. With regard to data on enquiries to the Notarial OCP, there were 221 direct requests (2021–2025), whilst the CRAB received 262 requests (2021–2025) (see Annex V).

Given their characteristics, temporary consortia could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in a gradual manner.

Vulnerabilities:

- The requirements for setting them up are very straightforward, making them easily accessible.
- The specific characteristics of the public limited companies (PLC) or limited liability companies (LLC) that make up the joint venture.
- The complexity of the structure: due to its nature, and the fact that it is a private contract, there may be difficulties in identifying the beneficial owner.
- They are commonly used to secure large-scale public contracts, meaning that funds of lawful origin could be commingled with those of unlawful origin.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities mentioned above influence the assessment of inherent risk:

Table 46. Inherent risk of the Temporary Joint Venture

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Temporary Joint Venture	**Low**	**Low**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- They do not have their own legal personality and therefore cannot act separately from their partners
- They are established by a public deed which may be registered in the Special Register of the Ministry of Finance.
- The special scrutiny to which their activities and taxation are subject by the Financial and Tax Inspectorate.
- With regard to the supervision of beneficial ownership declarations for products reported to the FTF, in 2022 a request was made to 134 credit institutions to rectify beneficial ownership information relating to contracted products. Of these, 4,740 products were held by joint ventures (TJV). Since then, specific requests for the correction of information have been issued; failure to comply with these would trigger a supervisory alert. To date, no such alerts have been issued, as the requested information has been provided within the specified timeframe.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for trade unions and professional associations would be as follows:

Table 47. Residual risk of joint ventures

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Temporary Joint Venture	**Low**	**Low**

7.21 Owners' Association

Homeowners' associations lack legal personality and act to manage common elements. The owners are, simultaneously, administrators and beneficiaries. The Articles of Association of the Homeowners' Association are the public deed by which a building is subject to the horizontal property regime.

Threats

Only 11 suspicious transaction reports were made during the period in relation to owners' associations, whilst the number of financial intelligence reports in which they were mentioned rose to 18. With regard to data on enquiries to the Notarial OCP, there were 61 direct requests (2021–2025), whilst the CRAB received 59 requests (2021–2025) (see Annex V).

Given their characteristics, owners' associations could be utilised for AML/CFT in the context of gradual implementation.

Vulnerabilities:

- The identification of its members, as the concept of beneficial ownership is diluted within owners' associations.

- When the property is transferred, membership of the owners' association is also transferred.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities referred to above influence the determination of the inherent risk:

Table 48. Inherent risk of the owners' association.

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Homeowners' association	**Low-Medium**	**Low-Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies (relating to the existence of centralised prevention and supervision bodies and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- They do not have their own legal personality and therefore cannot act independently of their members.
- The flow of financial and commercial transactions is fairly predictable, which makes it easier to identify any deviations by regulated entities.
- Due to the very nature of the entity and its activities, they do not normally feature in commercial transactions.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for owners' associations would be as follows:

Table 49. Residual risk of the owners' association

Type of company	**ML risk**	**TF risk**
Homeowners' association	**Low**	**Low**

7.22 Joint Ownership

These are agreements between individuals to manage joint assets. They lack legal personality and there is no separation between control and benefit: the members of the community are co-owners and beneficiaries. As regards the number of people required to form such a community, at least two partners are needed, in this case referred to as 'comuneros'.

A community of property established for the purpose of running a business may be formed by private or public contract, except where assets or rights in rem are contributed, in which case it must be established by a public deed drawn up before a notary.

The number of communities of property established before a notary in Spain over the five-year period from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2023 was 746.

Threats

Data from SEPBLAC, the Notarial OCP and CRAB show a higher incidence of this type of arrangement. Thus, 81 suspicious transaction reports submitted during the period related to communities of property, whilst the number of financial intelligence reports in which they were mentioned rose to 169. With regard to data on enquiries to the Notarial OCP, there were 1,073 direct requests (2021–2025), whilst the CRAB received 792 requests (2021–2025) (see Annex V).

Given their characteristics, joint ownership arrangements could be exploited for money laundering and terrorist financing through gradual exploitation.

Vulnerabilities:

- They need only be registered and established before a notary in cases where immovable property or rights in rem over such property are contributed; in all other cases, they may be established by private contract.
- As with civil partnerships, the regulations are very general and vague in many respects, leaving their operation to be determined by the terms of the memorandum of association.
- The difficulty in identifying the parties, given their possible integration into more complex legal structures. The co-owners (who may be natural or legal persons of any nationality) may remain anonymous, making them difficult to verify.
- The cost of formation is very low, particularly if the contract is not notarised and is not registered.
- Only two co-owners are required to form a Community of Property.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities mentioned above influence the assessment of inherent risk:

Table 50. Inherent risk of a Joint Ownership

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Joint Ownership	**Medium**	**Low-Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- They do not have legal personality of their own and therefore cannot act separately from their partners.

- The unusual nature of undertaking business or economic projects through this type of legal entity, which makes such arrangements highly uncommon and conspicuous.
- With regard to the supervision of beneficial ownership declarations submitted in relation to products reported to the FTF, in 2022 a request was made to 134 credit institutions to rectify beneficial ownership information for contracted products. Of these, 19,642 products were held by communities of property. Since then, ad hoc requests for the correction of information have been issued; failure to comply with these would trigger a supervisory alert. To date, no alerts have been issued as this request for information has been rectified within the deadline.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk associated with joint ownership entities would be as follows:

Table 51 Residual risk of joint ownership entities

Type of company	ML Risk	TF risk
Joint Ownership	**Low**	**Low**

7.23 Foreign legal persons operating in Spain

The identification of foreign legal persons has been based on the indicators and parameters referred to in section 4.4. From the data cited, and in order to contextualise the countries of origin, it is worth noting that in 2025, 104,834 notarial transactions were carried out by foreign legal entities, with more than 68% relating to transactions involving companies from EU countries, whilst the remainder involved companies from non-EU third-country jurisdictions. Furthermore, according to the list of non-cooperative jurisdictions considered in this analysis, it is estimated that only 0.11 per cent of notarial transactions were carried out by companies from these jurisdictions.

Threats:

For the purposes of this analysis, the threats are set out in section 5.2 for foreign legal persons as a whole. In general, the available data show a greater presence of legal persons similar to Spanish LLCs.

An assessment of the companies posing the greatest risk in notarial transactions was conducted by weighting the files analysed by the OCP against those which, after analysis, were ultimately reported to Sepblac. The main jurisdictions posing the highest risk, based on cases reported to Sepblac, were the Netherlands Antilles, Barbados, the British Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Panama, Liechtenstein, the Isle of Man, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, New Zealand, Gibraltar and the Seychelles.

Vulnerabilities:

Whilst the vulnerabilities identified for each type of legal entity at national level may largely apply to their foreign counterparts, the following points should be noted regarding the specific characteristics of foreign legal persons operating in Spain:

- The lack of transparency regarding beneficial ownership means that, with the exception of those entities operating under the freedom to provide services or subject to registration or identification requirements in Spain – which have higher levels of transparency – knowledge of beneficial ownership depends on the level of transparency regarding beneficial ownership that exists in their countries of origin. Consequently, this will depend on the transparency requirements in place in the countries of origin, thereby distinguishing between Member States – particularly those whose beneficial ownership registers are interconnected via the Beneficial Ownership Registers Interconnection System (BORIS), with levels comparable to the national framework – and jurisdictions with lower levels of transparency.

- With regard to vulnerabilities arising from incorporation, those companies which, by their nature, resemble limited companies will generally be more vulnerable, insofar as they are straightforward to set up.
- With regard to vulnerabilities arising from transparency in management, those companies which, by their nature, are permitted in their jurisdictions of origin to appoint nominal directors and to designate a legal person as a director, make it difficult to identify the natural persons who exercise effective control and actual management of the entity.
- As regards vulnerabilities arising from financial transparency, with the exception of those entities operating through a permanent establishment, they are under no obligation to file or have their accounts audited in Spain, which makes it difficult to ascertain their operations. However, legal persons from other Member States of the European Union will have a level of financial transparency similar to that of Spanish companies, insofar as Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013[36] applies.
- The complexity arising from cross-border structures, particularly where there are chains of shareholdings across multiple jurisdictions, can make it difficult to identify the beneficial owner, trace the origin of funds and understand the entity's actual economic operations, especially where shell companies are used solely for the purpose of channelling funds.

Inherent risk

Taking into account the points highlighted in the section on vulnerabilities, it is particularly noteworthy that, irrespective of the type of legal entity – in such cases, the specific characteristics outlined in the relevant sections must be taken into account – the jurisdiction of origin plays an essential role in determining inherent risk, as it determines the level of transparency that exists.

[36] Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013, on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and other related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC

Vulnerabilities relating to a lack of transparency in beneficial and financial ownership, in particular, are decisive in defining the categories of inherent risk:

Table 52. Inherent risk of foreign legal persons

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Legal persons from other EU Member States	**Medium**	**Medium**
Legal persons from non-EU third countries	**Substantial-High**	**Substantial-High**
Legal persons from non-cooperative jurisdictions	**Substantial-High**	**Substantial-High**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies concerning the existence of centralised bodies for prevention and supervision and measures implemented by obliged entities, the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted:

- Spain's participation in international and European mechanisms for administrative, financial, police and judicial cooperation facilitates the exchange of information on foreign legal entities. Of particular note are the cooperation mechanisms between Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) in the European Union through the FIU.net network and the framework established by Directive (EU) 2015/849, the European Union's instruments for judicial and police cooperation (including Europol, Eurojust and European Investigation Orders), as well as the mechanisms for the exchange of tax and registry information between Member States.
- As mentioned above, the interconnection of commercial and beneficial ownership registers at European level, including the BORIS system, facilitates cross-border access to certain corporate and beneficial ownership information.
- With regard to the supervision of beneficial ownership declarations for products reported to the FTF, in 2022 a request was made to 134 credit institutions to rectify beneficial ownership information relating to contracted products. Of these, 631 products were held by legal persons with a permanent establishment in Spain. Since then, ad hoc requests for the correction of information have been issued; failure to comply with these would trigger a supervisory alert. To date, no alerts have been issued as this request for information has been rectified within the specified timeframe.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for public limited companies would be as follows:

Table 53. Residual risk for foreign legal persons

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Legal persons from other Member States	**Low-Medium**	**Low-Medium**
Legal persons from non-cooperative jurisdictions	**Substantial**	**Substantial**
Legal persons from other jurisdictions	**Substantial**	**Substantial**

7.24 Trusts and other foreign legal arrangements operating in Spain

As highlighted in section 4.4, the presence of foreign legal arrangements can only be understood indirectly, as they have previously been incorporated as legal persons. Their presence is clearly limited:

- With regard to the data obtained from the Financial Ownership Register, there were only six active accounts in which the word 'trust' appeared across four different financial institutions, belonging to companies of Argentine, US and Mexican nationality, which were listed as account holders.
- With regard to the data obtained from the Centralised Notarial Prevention Agency, an analysis of 59,397 transactions carried out since 2006 revealed the actual presence of a trust in 83 cases, although in no case did it appear to be operating directly before a notary. Thus, in 81 cases, it appeared as an intermediary entity in the chain of ownership of another foreign legal person.
- From the data obtained from the Register of Corporate and Fiduciary Service Providers, it was found that none were providing fiduciary services to trusts or other foreign legal structures.
- Finally, from the data obtained from the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership regarding registered *trusts* and similar legal instruments, only one application – for a US trust – has been received for registration, which is pending the receipt of additional documentation.

Threats

No data is available to indicate their possible use based on the information provided by SEPBLAC, the OCP of the Notarial Profession and the CRAB.

From a theoretical perspective, it is difficult to determine, in general terms, the level of threat posed by trusts without referring to a specific type. At this general level, a higher-than-average level of risk is associated with *inter vivos trusts* (*living trusts*) and, in particular, with *offshore trusts* (regulated under the laws of an *offshore* jurisdiction). More specifically, the risk stems from various circumstances:

- The attempt to conceal the true owner of the assets by using a nominee. This is because ownership of the assets changes (they are registered in the various registers in *the trustee's* name) and, in most cases, the existence of a trust deed (and its terms) is unknown.
- *The trustee's* ability to decide how and when income is distributed makes the trust a suitable instrument for *'aggressive tax planning*'.
- Conceptual uncertainties in Spain regarding the tax treatment of income prevent a uniform approach to all *trusts*; consequently, it will be necessary to determine on a case-by-case basis (i) whether taxation is subject to the income attribution regime, as with other similar structures (civil partnerships, undistributed income, communities of property, etc.) and (ii) whether the income is attributed to *the settlor* or the beneficiary.
- The origin of the funds placed in the *trust*. This complexity merely leads to a substantial increase in the level of risk, not only because of the higher potential amount of tax evasion – with the consequent risk of committing a tax offence – but also because of the possibility of exploiting this lack of clarity to include funds derived from other sources.
- In the case of *offshore trusts*, the risk is heightened as companies or financial institutions are involved from which it is difficult to obtain any information.

Owing to their characteristics, *trusts* and other foreign legal arrangements could be used for money laundering and terrorist financing in terms of their intended use.

Vulnerabilities:

- They are established by private contract, which is generally not registered with a public register.
- They may incorporate numerous clauses governing their operation.
- They are usually located in high-risk jurisdictions.
- Lack of transparency regarding the identities of the various parties to the contract.

Inherent risk

The vulnerabilities mentioned above influence the assessment of inherent risk:

Table 54. Inherent risk of foreign legal persons

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Trusts and other similar foreign legal arrangements	**Substantial**	**Medium**

Mitigation measures and residual risk

In addition to the general measures referred to in the section on limited liability companies, which apply to all types of legal persons (registration of beneficial ownership, centralised

prevention and supervision bodies, and measures implemented by obliged entities), the following specific mitigating measures may be highlighted

- They do not have legal personality of their own and therefore cannot act independently. Thus, when a *trust or* similar legal instrument wishes to operate in Spain, it requires the incorporation of a legal entity, as demonstrated by data from the FTF and the Notarial OCP.
- The unusual nature of undertaking business or economic projects through this type of legal entity, which makes such arrangements highly uncommon and conspicuous.

Taking into account the existing mitigating factors, the residual risk for trade unions and professional associations would be as follows:

Table 55. Residual risk of foreign legal persons

Type of company	ML risk	TF risk
Trusts and other similar foreign legal structures	**Medium**	**Low-Medium**

8. Conclusions

The analysis of inherent risk shows that legal arrangements present varying levels of exposure arising from their own characteristics and the type of threats they face. Particularly noteworthy, amongst those incorporated in Spain, is the prevalence of limited liability companies (irregular LLCs, inactive LLCs, LLCs with revoked tax identification numbers, LLCs with individual shareholders resident or domiciled in high-risk territories, LLCs with corporate shareholders domiciled in high-risk territories linked to a lack of transparency, asset-holding LLCs, and LLCs with complex shareholding structures), which account for the threats identified in section 5.1. This finding is mainly explained by the fact that these companies account for the largest proportion of the Spanish business structure and because those identified possess characteristics that distinguish them from LLCs in general.

The use of legal arrangements in Spain is not common; the establishment of trusts is not permitted, and the only legal structure available is the succession trust, which is rarely used and carries a lower risk than the companies identified above.

In the case of those incorporated abroad, information drawn from communications based on suspicion, financial intelligence reports and notarial transactions suggests that legal persons from non-EU third countries pose the greatest risk.

From a structural perspective, the existence of a significant number of inactive or non-compliant entities constitutes the system's main vulnerability, as it allows formally existing structures to operate with insufficient levels of transparency and supervision. This circumstance, combined with persistent shortcomings in the identification of beneficial owners and the use of complex or transnational structures, creates an environment conducive to the concealment of assets and the channelling of illicit funds.

Furthermore, the analysis shows that certain economic sectors and geographical areas act as risk hotspots, whilst the international dimension of many of the operations analysed highlights the importance of strengthening cooperation and the exchange of information between jurisdictions, particularly among non-cooperative ones.

Nevertheless, the Spanish system has a significant set of mitigation measures, both institutional and operational, which help to reduce overall exposure to risk. These include registration mechanisms, the growing availability of information on beneficial ownership, and the role of regulated entities in detecting and preventing suspicious transactions.

In this context, the main challenge lies in improving the effectiveness of transparency and control mechanisms, particularly in relation to dormant entities, complex structures and cross-border transactions involving non-cooperative jurisdictions.

Based on this sectoral risk assessment, the mitigating measures designed to address these identified risks for individuals and legal persons are integrated in a coordinated manner into the National Anti-Money Laundering Strategy, approved on 12 June 2026.

ACRONYMS

AML/CFT: Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism.

BORIS: European Union Interconnection System for Beneficial Ownership Registers.

CRAB: Centro Registral Antiblanqueo (Anti-Money Laundering Registry Centre).

CS: Cooperative Society.

EIG: Economic Interest Grouping.

FATF: Financial Action Task Force.

FTF: Fichero de Titularidades Financieras (Financial Ownership Register).

LEAs: Law Enforcement Agencies.

LLC : Limited Liability Company.

LPS: Limited Partnership with Share Capital.

ML: Money Laundering.

ML/TF: Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.

MGS. Mutual Guarantee Societies.

NPOs: Non-Profit Organisations.

NRA: National Risk Assessment.

OCP: Órgano Centralizado de Prevención (Centralised Prevention Agency of the General Council of Notaries).

PLC: Public Limited Company.

RCTIR: Central Register of Beneficial Ownership.

RETIR: Register of Beneficial Ownership.

SEPBLAC: Servicio Ejecutivo de la Comisión de Prevención del Blanqueo de Capitales e Infracciones Monetarias (Executive Service for the Prevention of Money Laundering).

SLP: Simple Limited Partnership.

TIN: Tax Identification Number.

TF: Terrorist Financing.

TJV: Temporary Joint Venture.

ANNEX I. Participating institutions

The preparation of this analysis has involved representatives from all the relevant stakeholders within the sector, both public and private.

Among the public sector stakeholders, the following institutions have participated:

- State Tax Administration Agency, Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria (AEAT).
- National Intelligence Centre, Centro Nacional de Inteligencia (CNI).
- Centre for Intelligence against Terrorism and Organised Crime, Centro de Inteligencia contra el Terrorismo y el Crimen Organizado (CITCO).
- General Commissariat of the Judicial Police of the Policía Nacional.
- General Directorate of Information of the Policía Nacional.
- National Securities Market Commission, Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV).
- General Council of the Judiciary, Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ).
- Special Anti-Drugs Prosecutor's Office.
- Prosecutor's Office of the Audiencia Nacional.
- Special Public Prosecutor's Office for Corruption and Organised Crime.
- Guardia Civil Information Directorate.
- Central Register of Beneficial Ownership (RCTIR).
- General Secretariat of the Treasury and International Finance.
- Executive Service for the Prevention of Money Laundering, Servicio Ejecutivo de la Comisión de Prevención del Blanqueo de Capitales e Infracciones Monetarias (SEPBLAC).
- Criminal Intelligence Unit of the Guardia Civil (UTPJ).

On the private sector side, two working groups were set up with participants from both the financial and non-financial private sectors.

On the non-financial side, information was provided by representatives of the regulated entities most directly involved in the scope of this report, namely the General Council of Notaries (OCP), the Anti-Money Laundering Registry Centre (CRAB) and the General Council of Spanish Lawyers. In particular, extensive information was obtained from the OCP, owing to the notarial profession's mandatory involvement in a series of operations in which individuals and legal persons are involved, specifically the incorporation of all commercial companies, capital increases and reductions in all commercial companies, the transfer of shares in limited liability companies and all transfers for consideration (inheritances, gifts), and from the CRAB, due to its role as the centralised body responsible for preventing registrars from registering companies in the commercial register, as well as the information available regarding property ownership and beneficial ownership.

Representing the financial sector, the following institutions took part:

- Spanish Banking Association (AEB).
- Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, PLC
- Banco Santander, PLC.
- Banco de Crédito Social Cooperativo, PLC.
- CaixaBank, PLC

- CecaBank, PLC
- Deutsche Bank, PLC
- National Union of Credit Cooperatives (UNACC).

In addition to direct involvement in the discussion of the draft analysis, a questionnaire was circulated via the UNACC, Cecabank and the AEB to the other institutions operating under the umbrella of these associations.

ANNEX II. Sources of information.

This analysis has drawn on various sources of information, both qualitative and quantitative. These include public documents, as well as detailed information questionnaires requested from the public and private sectors.

Risk analyses and other strategic documents

- Addendum to the 2024 National Risk Analysis (NRA).
- National Risk Assessment on Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2020).
- Supranational Risk Assessment (European Commission, 2022).

Guidelines and best practice documents

- FATF – **Concealment of the Identity of Ultimate Beneficiaries.**
- FATF – **Best Practices on Ultimate Beneficiaries for Legal Entities**.
- FATF – **Guidance on Ultimate Beneficiaries of Legal Entities.**
- FATF – **Guidance on Ultimate Beneficiaries of Legal Structures.**
- WORLD BANK – Legal Persons and Arrangements ML Risk Assessment Tool.

Primary sources

- Requests for information from the various public sector authorities and bodies that have contributed to the preparation of this analysis.
- Enquiries to the Single Notarial Index.
- Enquiries to the Central Register of Beneficial Ownership (hereinafter RCTIR).
- Enquiries to the Register of Beneficial Owners of the Commercial Register.
- Meetings with private sector working groups.
- Questionnaires requesting information from the private sector.

ANNEX III. Regulations relating to commercial legal entities

	Main legislation
Limited Liability Company	Act 3/2009 of 3 April on structural changes to commercial companies. Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010 of 2 July, approving the Law on Companies with Share Capital. Act 14/2013 of 27 September on support for entrepreneurs and their internationalisation. Act 18/2022 of 28 September on the creation and growth of businesses. Act 11/2023 of 8 May on the transposition of EU Directives, which permits certain notarial acts to be carried out via videoconference.
Public Limited Company	Act 3/2009 of 3 April on structural changes to commercial companies. Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010 of 2 July, approving the Law on Capital Companies. Law 14/2013 of 27 September on support for entrepreneurs and their internationalisation. Act 18/2022 of 28 September on the creation and growth of businesses.
Commercial Civil Partnership	Civil Code (Articles 1665 to 1708) Commercial Code (civil partnerships of a commercial nature). Regional regulations for certain types of company (Agricultural Processing Companies).
General Partnership	Commercial Code (Articles 125 to 144) Regulations of the Commercial Register (Article 209).
Limited Partnership	Commercial Code (Articles 145 to 150). Regulations of the Commercial Register (Articles 210 to 212).
Limited Partnership by Shares	Royal Legislative Decree 1/2010 of 2 July, approving the Companies Act. Commercial Code. Regulations of the Commercial Register (Articles 213 to 215). Act 3/2009 on structural changes to commercial companies.
Cooperative	Act 27/1999 of 16 July on Cooperatives Act 20/1990 on the tax regime for cooperatives regional legislation governing specific aspects.
Economic Interest Grouping	Act 12/1991 of 29 April on Economic Interest Groupings. Regulation (EEC) No 2137/85 on the European Economic Interest Grouping.

	Regulations on the Commercial Register (Articles 264 to 269).
Mutual Guarantee Society	Act 1/1994 of 11 March on the Legal Regime for Mutual Guarantee Societies. Royal Decree 2345/1996 on administrative authorisation and solvency. Act 10/2014 on the regulation and supervision of credit institutions.
Employee-Owned Companies	Act 44/2015 of 14 October on Employee-Owned and Participated Companies.
Joint ventures in the form of companies	Commercial Code (Articles 239 to 243)

ANNEX IV. Regulations relating to non-commercial legal entities

	Main legislation
Foundations	Act 50/2002 of 26 December on Foundations. Act 49/2002 of 23 December on the Tax Regime for Non-Profit Organisations. Regional laws on foundations. Royal Decree 1337/2005 of 11 November, approving the Regulations on foundations falling within the remit of the State.
Associations	The Spanish Constitution (Article 22). The Articles of Association governing the operation of each association. Organic Law 1/2002 of 22 March, regulating the right of association. Act 49/2002 of 23 December on the Tax Regime for Non-Profit Organisations. Royal Decree 1740/2003 of 19 December on public-benefit associations. Royal Decree 949/2015 of 23 October, Regulations of the National Register of Associations.
Political parties	Organic Act 6/2002 of 27 June on Political Parties. Organic Law 8/2007 of 4 July on the funding of political parties. Organic Law 5/1985 of 19 June on the General Electoral System. Act 19/2013 of 9 December on Transparency.
Trade unions and professional associations	Organic Law 11/1985 of 2 August on Freedom of Association. Organic Law 1/2002 of 22 March on the Right of Association. Act 2/1974 of 13 February on Professional Bodies. Act 25/2009 of 22 December.
Religious organisation	Spanish Constitution (Article 16). Organic Law 7/1980 of 5 July on Religious Freedom. Agreements of 28 July 1976, 3 January 1979 and 21 September 1994 between the Kingdom of Spain and the Holy See. Agreements between the Spanish State and religious denominations. Act 24/1992 of 10 November, approving the Cooperation Agreement between the State and the Federation of Evangelical Religious Organisations of Spain (FEREDE). Act 25/1992 of 10 November, approving the Cooperation Agreement between the State and the Federation of Jewish Communities of Spain. Law 26/1992, of 10 November, approving the Cooperation Agreement between the State and the Islamic Commission of Spain. Act 49/2002 of 23 December on the tax regime for non-profit organisations and tax incentives for patronage, and its

	implementing regulations. Royal Decree 594/2015 of 3 July, regulating the Register of Religious Organisations. Royal Decree 593/2015 of 3 July, regulating the declaration of well-established roots of religious denominations in Spain.
Non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs)	Act 1/2023 of 20 February on Cooperation for Sustainable Development and Global Solidarity

ANNEX V. Statistical data for the purposes of threats

Table 1: Legal persons included in suspicious transaction reports during the period 2020–2024, by type of company

Grouping	TOTAL	
	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
Public limited companies	**1,719**	**2.76%**
Limited liability companies	**45,849**	**73.52%**
Partnerships	**1**	**0.00%**
Limited partnerships	**1**	**0.00%**
Community property arrangements	**81**	**0.13%**
Co-operative societies	**101**	**0.16%**
Associations	**267**	**0.43%**
Homeowners' associations (horizontal property regime)	**11**	**0.02%**
Civil partnerships (whether or not they have legal personality)	**157**	**0.25%**
Non-resident entities	**1,005**	**1.61%**
Local authorities	**4**	**0.01**
Public bodies	**5**	**0.01%**
Religious congregations and institutions	**33**	**0.05%**
State and regional government bodies	**19**	**0.03%**
Companies forming temporary partnerships	**24**	**0.04%**
Undefined companies or others	**158**	**0.25%**
Non-resident entities	**48**	**0.08%**
ES without documentation	**1,615**	**2.59%**
Foreign nationals without documents	**11,266**	**18.06%**
TOTAL	**62,364**	**100.00%**

Table 2. Spanish legal persons included in Spanish suspicious transaction reports during the period 2020–2024, by type of company.

Type of company	Number of inclusions	Percentage
Public limited companies	**1,719**	3.5
Limited liability companies	**45,846**	92.7
Partnerships	**1**	0.0
Limited partnerships	**1**	0.0
Community of property	**81**	0.2
Co-operative societies	**101**	0.2
Associations	**267**	0.5
Homeowners' associations under the horizontal property regime	**11**	0.0
Civil partnerships (whether or not they have legal personality)	**157**	0.3
Non-resident entities operating without a permanent physical presence	**1,005**	2.0
Local authorities	**4**	0.0
Public bodies	**5**	0.0
Religious congregations and institutions	**33**	0.1

State and regional government bodies	**19**	0.0
Companies forming temporary partnerships	**24**	0.0
Undefined companies or others	**158**	0.3
Foreign entities with a permanent establishment	**48**	0.1
TOTAL	**49,480**	100.0

Source: Sepblac

Table 3. Legal persons included in financial intelligence reports issued between 2020 and 2024, by type of company. Weighted by the number of recipients.

Group	TOTAL	
	No. of reports	%
Public limited companies	3,642	2.70%
Limited liability companies	93,193	69.18%
Limited partnerships	2	0.00%
Community of property	169	0.13%
Co-operative societies	186	0.14%
Associations	420	0.31%
Homeowners' associations (horizontal property regime)	18	0.01%
Unincorporated partnerships (whether or not they have legal personality)	186	0.14%
Non-resident entities	1,231	0.91%
Local authorities	5	0.00%
Public bodies	8	0.01%
Religious congregations and institutions	61	0.05%
State and regional government bodies	30	0.02%
Companies forming temporary partnerships	43	0.03%
Unclassified companies or others	151	0.11%
Non-resident entities	85	0.06%
ES without documentation	1,721	1.28%
Foreign nationals without documents	33,558	24.91%
TOTAL	**134,709**	**100.00%**

Table 4. Spanish legal persons included in financial intelligence reports issued between 2020 and 2024, by type of company. Weighted by the number of recipients.

TYPE OF COMPANY	Number of mentions	Percentage
Limited liability companies	93,193	92.13
Public limited companies	3,642	3.60
ES without documentation	1,721	1.70
Non-resident entities operating without a permanent physical presence	1,316	1.30
Associations	420	0.42

Civil partnerships (whether or not they have legal personality)	186	0.18
Co-operative societies	186	0.18
Joint ownership entities	169	0.17
Undefined companies or others	151	0.15
Religious congregations and institutions	61	0.06
Companies forming temporary partnerships	43	0.04
State and regional government bodies	30	0.03
Owners' associations under the horizontal property regime	18	0.02
Public bodies	8	0.01
Local authorities	5	0.00
Limited partnerships	2	0.00
Grand total	**101,151**	**100**

Source: Sepblac

Table 5: Total direct requests concerning legal persons during the period 2021–2025.

Source: Notarial OCP

Table 6: Requests concerning individual legal persons during the period 2026–2025

	DIRECT REQUESTS 2006–2025			
TYPE OF COMPANY	**MONEY LAUNDERING**	**TAX**	**THIRD PARTIES**	**TOTAL**
A-SA	3,893	17,239	953	**22,085**
B-LLC	61,387	163,749	20,880	**246,016**
C-General Partnership	7	24	1	**32**
D-Limited Partnerships	3	32	2	**37**
E-Communities of Property	356	1,291	151	**1,798**
F-Co-operative Societies	345	1,346	233	**1,924**
G-Associations	871	1,035	168	**2,074**
H-Homeowners' associations	14	73	19	**106**
J-Civil partnerships	364	938	207	**1,509**
P-Local Authorities	35	26	4	**65**
Q-Public bodies	37	67	24	**128**
R-Religious congregations	82	33	4	**119**
S-Administrative Bodies	5	5	3	**13**
U-Joint Venture	151	321	37	**509**

V-OTHERS	100	780	27	**907**
TOTAL	**67,650**	**186,959**	**22,713**	**277,322**

Source: Notarial OCP

Table 7: Requests received by the Anti-Money Laundering Registry Centre from other authorities concerning legal persons during the period 2021–2025

TYPE OF COMPANY	Requests	% (Requests/registered)
Public Limited Company	42,239	8.43%
LLC	444,311	88.72%
General Partnership	149	0.03%
Limited partnerships	99	0.02%
Joint ownership entities	792	0.16%
Co-operative Societies	1,539	0.31%
Associations, Foundations, Political Parties and Trade Unions	2,616	0.52%
Homeowners' associations	59	0.01%
Civil partnerships	572	0.11%
Non-resident entities	4,100	0.82%
Local authorities	1,548	0.31%
Public bodies	313	0.06%
Religious congregations	158	0.03%
Administrative Bodies	538	0.11%
Temporary Joint Ventures	262	0.05%
Agricultural Processing Companies	698	0.14%
Permanent establishments of entities not resident in Spain	835	0.17%
TOTAL	**500,828**	**100.00%**

Source: CRAB

Table 8: Number of money laundering investigations initiated by the Guardia Civil involving identified legal persons.

	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
INITIATED BY A SEPBLAC REPORT	4	63	50	50	29
OWN INITIATIVE	79	51	31	44	34
TOTAL	**83**	**114**	**81**	**94**	**63**

Source: Guardia Civil

Table 9: Legal persons identified in money laundering investigations initiated by the Guardia Civil, by country of origin

		2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	TOTAL
INITIATED BY SEPBLAC REPORT	FOREIGN	0	0	0	2 (Portugal: 1; Cyprus: 1)	1 (Slovakia)	**3**
	NATIONAL	7	99	8	32	104	**250**
OWN INITIATIVE	FOREIGN	16 (Netherlands: 1; Panama: 2; Portugal: 2; Sweden: 1; Germany: 2; France: 2; UAE: 1; Nigeria: 1; United Kingdom: 3; Bulgaria: 1)	43 (Germany: 2; Belgium: 8; USA: 1; France: 12; Luxembourg: 1; Netherlands: 4; Portugal: 11; United Kingdom: 3; Venezuela: 1)	38 (Germany: 1; Belgium: 8; Brazil: 3; Colombia: 1; Dominica: 1; France: 10; United Kingdom: 2; Israel: 1; Morocco: 1; Mexico: 1; Netherlands: 5; Panama: 1; Poland: 1; Portugal: 2)	38 (Colombia: 1; Costa Rica: 1; UAE: 2; Slovakia: 1; France: 6; Hungary: 2; Italy: 3; Luxembourg: 3; Morocco: 1; Norway: 1; Netherlands: 5; Panama: 2; Paraguay: 1; Poland: 2; Portugal: 1; United Kingdom: 1; Czech Republic: 2; Romania: 1; Saint Vincent: 1; Singapore: 1; Switzerland: 1)	25 (Germany: 2; Belgium: 1; China: 1; Cyprus: 1; Colombia: 1; Costa Rica: 1; France: 1; Italy: 1; Malta: 1; Nigeria: 2; Norway: 1; Netherlands: 1; Peru: 2; Portugal: 6; United Kingdom: 1; Dominican Republic: 1; No data: 1)	**160**
	NATIONAL	200	298	180	257	189	**1124**
TOTAL		**223**	**440**	**226**	**329**	**319**	**1537**

Source: Guardia Civil

Table 10: Legal persons charged/convicted in ML /TF judgements handed down by the Audiencia Nacional and the Audiencias Provinciales for the period 2019–2024

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024
National Court	2	1	3	0	3	2
Provincial Court	3	0	1	4	2	6
Convicted	1	1	1	2	4	8

Source: CENDOJ